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PREFACE 
This thesis on General Hans von Seeckt's political idea has three aims. 
The first is a presentation of the content of his published works. Because 
there is little aYailable in English concerned with these specific books, they 
have been given in as objective and detailed a manner as possible. This is 
also the reason for the biographical section which has tried to present facts 
not usually'tound in accounts of his life. 
Secondly, though mu.ch has been written about Seeckt's actions, their 
interpretation remains to be clarified. This thesis does not pretend to do so, 
but rather it should provide the perspective for such clarification. It 
should also be mentioned that Gordon's excellent study ot the Reichswerh's 
relations to the Republic, partly based on Seechkt's private papers, reveals 
nothing contradictory to what is contained in his published works. 
Thirdly, Seeckt and his ideas have some meaning for the contemporary world 
situation. To draw parallels between his time and our own would not be 
difficult. It is hoped that this presentation may help to focus more sharply 
on the relationship of military and political forces in our age of nuclear 
weapons. 
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CHAPTER I 
BIOGRAPHICAL BACKGRO~ID 
Ironically the Seeckt coat or arms featured a dove bearing an olive branch 
in its beak. This dove of peace was the symbol or an aristocratic family whic 
had left Eastern Europe for Sweden sometime prior to 1700.1 In 1816 Rudolf vo 
Seeckt, the grandfather of Hans and the family's first military member, left 
the Swedish ar~ to join the Prussian army in hopes of rapid promotion in its 
reorganization following the Napoleonic Wars.2 In this he was disappointed but 
he stayed on and married Emma Israels,3 whose Italian ancestors had settled in 
Pomerania about 1600. Their son, Richard August, also entered the army and 
rose rapidly to the rank of general during the three wars that created 
Bismarck's Reich. Richard married his first cousin, Auguste von Seeckt, whose 
~he family's origin was probably Hungarian or perhaps Polish although 
Seeckt himself felt his ancestors must have been Nordic and their origin 
exclusively Swedish. Friedrich von Rabenau, Hans von Seeckt. Aus meinem Leben 
1866-1917 (Leipzig, 1938), p. 14. Also consult Edgar von Schmidt-Paul!, -
General !2!! Seeckt: Lebensbild ~ Deutschen Soldaten (Berlin, 1937). 
2Rabenau prefers not to call the Seeckt family ftJunkers II unless that 
Itcatchword" is taken to mean nobility and strength of character. He emphasizes 
especially that only the last two generations before Hans represented ~ 
military tradition. Rabenau, ~ ~ Seeckt, p. 13. 
3aabenau carefUlly points out that Israela "is an old Nordic name" and thi 
is a reminder of the date of publication and the consequent problem of possible 
supression in the use of Seeckt's papers. ~., p. 15. 
1 
2 
first and last boys died in infanoy. The seoond child, Marie, later became the 
Gratin von Rothkirch unci Trach. On April 22, 1866 was born Hans4 Friedrich 
Leopold, their third child and destined to be the last to bear the name of 
Seeckt. 
Schleswig in Schleswig-Holstein was Hans' birthplace, but in 1874 his 
father was stationed in Berlin.5 Here the young Hans began his life-long 
attachment to that city which seemed, he wrote his mother as a young man, to be 
more his real home than with his relatives.6 In 1881 the fami~ moved to 
Strasbourg where he oompleted his secondary education in 1885 at the Protestant 
Gymnasium. His final examinations there revealed his scholastic capabilities 
and he would have been able to matriculate.7 Instead, he decided upon a 
career in the military. 
After graduation in 1885, at the age of' nineteen, Seeckt entered the elite 
Kaiser Alexander Grenadier-Guards Regiment stationed in Berlin. The follOwing 
year he was sent. to study at the Hanover tl/ar College, where he was not entire 
happy because he felt the discipline was overly strict.8 In 1893 he was 
appointed to the liar Academy, from which in 1897 he entered the mobilization 
4His actual name was not Johannes but its diminutive Hans, and this he 
used throughout his life. Friedrich von Rabenau, Seeckt. Aus Seinem Leben 
1918-1936 (Leipzig, 1940), p. 320. -----
5Rabenau, !!!:!'!! !2!! Seeckt, p. 21. 
6 14. ~., p. 
7 ~., p. 22. 
8 ~., p. 26. 
3 
section of the Great General Staff.9 Two years later he was the staff officer 
of the XVIII .i>.:rrrr:J Corps in Danzig. His first direct command of troops came at 
the age of thirty-six as a Company Commander in Dusseldorf in 1902. Two years 
later he was staff officer to the Fourth Division at Bromberg, from which he 
was posted in 1906 to the General Staff in Berlin. He became staff officer to 
the Second Army Corps at Stettin in the year 1909. Promoted to major in 1912 
Seeckt became Battalion Commander of the First Baden Elite Grenadiers. The 
next year he was back in Berlin, this tilm a.s Chief of Staff of the Third 
Brandenburg Army Corps, the post he held on the eve of the First \"Jorld War. 
His early career had been that of the typical staff officer, alternating 
between schools, staff duties, and actual command of troops. 
It was during this long period of routine military training that Seeckt 
began his extensive foreign travels. Immediately following his graduation fro. 
the War College in 1893, he married Dorothea Fabian, and after a brief honey-
moon in Switzerland, he began his studies at the War Academy. Seeckt and his 
wife made almost yearly excursions that were to take them, betore the World 
l-Iar, to all parts of Western Europe, North A:f"rica, and India. Seeckt had a 
professional motive tor these frequent journeys besides the natural indulgence 
ot sight-seeing. In his biography of Bismarck's chief of staff, Seeckt 
mentioned that Moltke had advised every staft officer to be well-travelled in 
order to broaden his character by observing unfamiliar ways of life, and also 
9Craig puts hi. en1ry in the General Starf in 1899. Gordon Craig, The 
Politics 2! th~ Prussian ~ 1640-1945 (New York, 1956), p. )8). 
4 
as a means of developing his military tactical sense. This latter was done by 
fir st mastering every topographical feature of one's own country and how it ha 
played its part in previous battles, and then by observing, as would a milt 
attache, how a foreign country's geography and rosources could be used militar-
10 i~. It is clear that Seeckt did this on his own travels. For example, in 
a letter he stated that he has seen everything in India that was of interest 
militarily and that he had even been fortunate enough to have had two long 
11 
talks with General Kitchener. 
These travels ended with Sarajevo. Seeckt's Third Corps belonged to the 
First Army which had as its task the strike through Belgium towards Paris. 
After the initial success of the drive (during which Seeckt received the Iron 
Cross, First Class12) the First Army was forced by the outcome of the Battle 
of the ~1arne (September 5-12) to withdraw behind the Aisne River. The war of 
position in the 'jJest was gradual~ coming into being. But on October 31, the 
Third Corps won a victory at Vail~ which it quickly followed up two days 
later by a similar gain at Soupir. This created the conditions for the minor 
breakthrough by the First Arm¥ at Soissons in the first ~s of November. 
lVhether it was Seeckt's own plan or his application of a higher order that 
provided this opportunity is immaterial, for in any event, he correctly 
interpreted the weakness in the enemy's deployment and exploited it 
lD.Hans von Seeckt, Noltka, ain Vorbild (Berlin, 1931), p. 39. 
l\abenau, !!!!!! ~ ;;.Se..;..e;..;;c;.;..;kt;.;;.' pp. 46-52. 
12~., p. 74. 
13 
successfully. 
As the man credited with the plans that were successful at Soissons, 
Seeckt was promoted to Colonel and attracted the attention of Falkenh~. He 
decided to use Seeckt as Chief of Staff in the Eleventh Army which was being 
formed for the purpose of achieving the final breakthrough in the \~est. How-
ever, before it could be brought together, the German High Command decided on 
victory in the East prior to a decision in France, and the embryo <Eleventh 
Army was sent to Galicia where the Austrians were hard-pressed. A joint 
Austro-Hungarian and German operation under the leadership of Mackensen with 
Seeckt as his chief of staff was begun with the capture of Gorlice on May 2, 
1915. The battle ended in a Russian rout and the subsequent loss of Poland but 
11 
the one great battle or annihilation, which was its object never materialized. 
Although Seeckt had planned the campaign with the object of completely destrqy-
ing all Russian forces in southeastern Europe, Falkenh~J harried in the West, 
could not send sufficient troops and supplies to achieve this goal. Thus the 
brilliant tactical victory of Gorlice was never brought to its contemplated 
strategic conclusion. ~ the end of the summer Mackensen was sent elsewhere, 
winter quarters were taken up, and another opportunity lost for a final end to 
the war against Russia. For his part in the campaign Seeckt received Germany's 
highest military honor, the ~~ _M_er_i.t.e, and a promotion to Brigadier 
13 Schmidt-Pauli, Seeckt, p. 32. 
14Rabenau, ~ ~ Seeckt, o. 150. 
15 
General (General-major). 
6 
The High Command now turned its attention in the East to the problems ot 
linking up with its Turkish ally which had become imperative since the British 
landings in Gallipoli. Bulgaria in July ot 1915 secretly agreed to enter the 
war on the side ot the Central Powers. This meant that a combined operation 
against Serbia would bring contact with Turkey. }1ackensen, newly released 
:f'rom Poland, was put in charge of this operation and his request for Seeckt as 
his Chief of Staft was soon granted. The team ot Mackensen and Seeekt began 
their drive with the capture of Belgrade on October 16. By November 6, the 
enemy was in full retreat and the way lay open to Sophia. The landing of 
Allied troops in neutral salonika came too late to stabilize the Balkan :f'ront, 
and in December the evacuation of Gallipoli began. 
AS a result the German line of attack was shifted to }lontenegro and 
Albania in a drive on Salonika. However, a new offensive by Italy caused the 
Aus~ian torees to be withdrawn from the Balkans and the Germans were lett with 
the indifterent Bulgarians to carry out the plan. The drive was being prepared 
to commence in April but Falkenhayn weakened Jv1ackensen t s forces for the all-out 
offensive at Verdun in February and at that time urged an immediate attack on 
Salonika so as to coincide with the Western offensi va. Seeckt advised 
Mackensen against it on the grounds that he could only plan his operations on 
the basis of what was militarily feasible and not what was politically expa-
16 dient. As a result the campaign against Salonika never began. 
15~., p. 158. 
16Schmidt-Pauli, Seeckt, p. 60. 
7 
In June, 1916 Seeckt was transferred from the Balkans to the Seventh Army 
as Chief of Staff to the Austrian Archduke Charles (soon to be the last 
emperor of h.ustria) llho was commanding the southeastern front. In effect his 
task was to coordinate the operations by the Central Powers in the entire 
sector.17 Two days after taking his post the Austrian line collapsed and a 
general retreat began. Ten days later they were back on the offensive and the 
lost ground recovered. By July fourth the front in East Galicia was broken an 
the way to Bokovina was opened. The following month a strong Russian counter-
attack sent the Austrians reeling back again. Seeckt requested five divisions 
to stabilize the front but could be spared only two. The situation now became 
what Seeckt always hated: a war of position. !-lobility was lost because of the 
lack of men, anmunition, and supplies. All that could be done under such 
circumstances was to hold the line in the dreary winter months that followed. 
The Russian revolution and the protracted truce that terminated in the Treaty 
of Brest-Litovsk eventually freed the troops on the Eastern front for other 
duties. 
In Dscember of 1917 Seeckt was sent to Turkey as Chief of the General 
Staf'f of the Turkish Arnv. There existed a great deal of antagonism between 
the two allies stemming on the one hand from their mutually divergent and 
unrealistic plans of expansion and on the other from the Young Turk leaders who 
wished to take their country out of the war. Seeckt, in the midst of these 
political intrigues, was barely able to re-establish the Palestinian front. A 
17Craig, Prussian Politics, p. 383. 
8 
palace revolution wasted this effort and the new government surrendered to the 
Allies on October 30. Seeckt, who was on exceptionally good terms with all th 
leading figures in Turkish political life, was allowed by the new regime to 
lead all of his troops with their weapons back to Germany. 
On January 10, 1919 Seeckt was appointed Chief of Staff to the Border 
Defense North. The Allies had permitted German military forces to remain under 
arms on their eastern frontier to guard against Bolshevik infiltration. The 
situation was chaotic: straggling German units fought their way back home and 
the Lithuanians and Poles were attemtpin~ to organize their own governments in 
the face of the German occupying forces. His official duties required him to 
work with such insubordinate officers as Ora! von dem Goltz, the commander of 
the Sixth Reserve Corps, which after the official liquidation of the Border 
Defense group, became his own Freikorps unit. Seecktts difficulties with Golt 
and other such commanders made him realize the hopelessness of their independe 
action. Although he felt that Germany needed eastern buffer territories for 
protection against antagonistic Eastern neighbors, he knew that the first 
priority of defense must be the creation of a strongly disciplined and united 
18 
military force. 
In April he was transferred to Versailles as chief military advisor to the 
German peace delegation. After the presentation of the Allied demands, Seeckt 
drafted a negative report on the military conditions. He put forth his views 
in a memorandum sent to the Gerrnan government on Hay 26 in which he castigated 
18 Schmidt-Pauli, S~eckt, p. 76. 
9 
the military conditions laid down by the Allies as impossible of fulfillment, 
19 but he added that resistance to the Allies was militarily out ot the question. 
Under these circumstances Germany signed the Peace Treaty on June 28, 1919. 
The last position he held in the imperial army was that of Chief of the 
20 Great General Staff and so he was formally the last of Moltke's successors. 
On November 24, 1919 Seeckt received his appointment as Chief of the Troop 
Oftice (Truppenamt) which served the newly created Reichswehr as a substitute 
for the Great General Starf outlawed by the Treaty. His immediate superior waa 
General Hans Reinhardt, Chief of the Arnw High Cormnand (Heeresleitung) who was 
subordinate to Gustav Noske, the Reichswehr Minister in the government's 
cabinet. 
A few months after assuming his duties in the Truppenamt, Seeckt and the 
Reichswehr faced a crisis of conscience in the torm of the Kapp Putsch, March 
13-17, 1920. Dr. Wolfgang Kapp, a minor official in the government, backed by 
the guns of General Walther von Luttwitz's Reichswehr troops and various 
Freikorps, declared an end to the Republic. Noske called together his military 
leaders to determine their attitude in the present situation. Reinhardt alone 
spoke for bmediate action by the Reichswehr to save the government. Seeckt, i 
contrast to the position he was to take in the Munich Putsch three years later, 
spoke for the other generals and stated the impossihility of using the Reich-
swher to fight other units of the Reichswehr. The government, unable to employ 
19Ibid., p. 80. 
20aabenau, Hans ~ Seekt, p. 203. 
10 
its military forces, fled Berlin and the abortive coup was ended a few dav~ 
later by a general strike. ~ben it returned, Noske was replaced by Otto 
Gessler and Seekt now became Chief of the Army Command. Noske had failed to 
contro 1 the armed forces and Reinhardt did not have his subordinates f 
confidence. 
Seeckt at fifty-four was now the Republic t s leading military figure. Sine 
his return from Turkey he had gradually emerged from the overabundant supply of . 
general staff officers whose future was uncertain to the position of creator of 
the new and severely handicapped army. His background was identical with that 
of most officers in the Prussian army who had come from the impoverished, 
uprooted, landless families of the nobility.B2l His prewar starf training and 
duties were certainly not out of the ordinary. His war record demonstrated 
some tactical ability, but hardly superior to that of many fellow officers. 
The last years of the war had been spent almost in exile, out of touch with the 
shifting developments of the home situation. He had cultivated no powerful 
friends in the political sphere which he heartily disliked. Even his admiring 
biographer admitted that he had too much humanity to be an ''historical 
fi ,,22 gure. 
Apparently his reports from the vital area of the Eastern Border Command, 
where he had been routine ly posted because of his experience there, was the 
2lwalter Goerlitz, History of the German General Staff 1657-1945 (New 
York, 1953), p. 56. - - - - -
22Rabenau, ~ !2!! Seeckt, p. 206. 
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reason for his selection for his advisory role at the Peace Conference. His 
work here led to his selection as Chief of the Truppenamt. He was in a posi-
tion of authority in which to take a stand on the question of the relation of 
the new Army to the new state, which was dividing the officer corps. The Kapp 
Putsch resolved the entire problem. The positions of Luttwitz that the arII'\Y 
become revolutionary and of Reinhardt that it become republican were official~ 
denied by Seeckt's appointment. 23 
Seeckt opposed both because he believed the army had to remain isolated 
from politics. Simply stated his position was that the Reichswehr was not to 
be used as a police power to combat a part.icular regime's political opponents. 
It was to be taken out of the realm of political intrigues. In demonstration 
of this viewpoint Seeckt set up the '~ommission for the Accomplishment of the 
Investigation of Those Concerned in the Kapp-Luttwitz Putsch." Its outcome was 
the dismissal of sixty officers and the shelving of 112 others. 24 The final 
result of the affair was Paragraph Thirty-six of the Defense Law promulgated 
on March 23, 1921: 
Soldiers may not engage in political activity. While on duty such 
activity is also forbidden to militar,r offiCials. Soldiers are 
forbidden to belong to political clubs or to participate in political 
meetings.25 
Seeckt as head of the Reichswehr was present at the Conference of July 
23walter Garlitz, Der Deutsche Generalsfab. Cleschichte und Gestalt 1657-
1945 (Frankfurt/am Ma1n;-t950), pp. 321-22. 
24sChmidt-Pau11, Seeckt, p. 98. 
25curt Riess, The Self Betrayedl Glory ~ ~ of ~ German Generals 
(New York, 1942), p:-71:---
12 
1920, where the allied demands for the final composition and structure of the 
German Army were imposed. Seeckt's arguments for various changes were not 
accepted and the hundred thousand man Reichswahr was required to comply with 
the Conference's provisions no later than January 1, 1921. The Allies assigned 
a military commission headed by General Nollet to ensure that all the 
conditions ware carried out to their satisfaction. Seeckt maintained that 
trying to negotiate successfully with this commission was one of his chief 
26 duties in the Army Command. 
Seeckt's energies were completely concentrated on the gigantiC task of 
reorganizing, within the treaty limitations, the broken Germany army so that it 
would be a military force capable of providing some guarantee of Germany's 
sovereignty and at the same time providing the nucleus for expansion in the 
future. Germany's political leaders paid little attention to the manner of 
this reorganization. The withdrawal of the Reichswehr from an active role in 
political affairs was the reason tor the government's apathy to what its 
military leaders were doing in their own work. The Reichswehr Minister, 
Gessler, felt that his duty was to represent the interests of the Army in the 
Reichstag rather than the opposite. This meant that under the protection of 
Gessler's ministerial office, Seeckt was in the position ()f having almost 
complete freedom in military matters. 27 
The year 1923 was the highpoint of Seeckt' s career. A t the beginning ot 
26aabenau, Seeckt, p. 44.5. 
27Harold J. Gordon, Jr., The Reichswehr and the German Republic 1919-1926 
(Princeton, New Jersey, 19.57), pp. 314-335. --- --- ---- ----
13 
January the French moved into the Ruhr under the terms of the Treaty which gave 
them the right of occupation if the reparations were in default. The German 
government was advised by its military that the Reichswehr did not possess the 
capability of stopping the French should they decide upon a further penetration 
of Garmany. The German leaders were also deeply disturbed by the separatist 
sentiments along the Rhine and in the south which were being supported by the 
French. In this crisis the government decided upon a policy of '~assive 
resistance" on January 12, 1923, to render the Ruhr unprofitable for the 
French. Instead of achieving this, a preoipitous inflation engulfed all 
Germany. 
The Ruhr crisis decided the Republic's leaders upon the necessity of 
improving their milit~ security. To this end, Seeckt met with Severing, the 
?russian Minister of the Interior, and they agreed upon the creation of an 
unofficial formation of men called Worker Troops (Arbeitertrup~) which would 
be trained and supplied with weapons by the Reichswehr. 28 This was the 
beginning of the so-called "Black Reichswehrll which proved to be more 
dangerous than useful because of their ill discipline and they were disbanded 
after the Kuatrin Revolt (October 1-3, 1923). 
On September 26, 1923 Dr. Gustav Strsaemann declared that the policy of 
passive resistance had failed and he accepted the government's obligation to 
maet all Allied demands. In response to this defeat, the separatist elements 
throughout Germany rapidly gained adherents and the Reich appeared near 
28Rabenau, Seeckt, p. 362. 
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dissolution. In Bavaria, Gustav von Kabr was appointed Commissioner of a 
Republic. TIlat night, September 27, 1923 Gessler was given executive powers 
under Article 48 of the Constitution and the military became virtual dicator. 
A few days later Hitler's Volkerischen Beobachter published a scurrilous 
attack against 3eeckt and he promptly ordered it to cease publication. 29 Kahr 
refused to execute the order and Seeckt ordered General Otto von Lossow, the 
Bavarian Reichswehr commander, to use the military to carry out the decree. 
Lossow refused and Kahr rewarded him with the appointment to head the 
Bavarian Republic's Army. At this point Seeckt decided on action but was 
overruled by the government. On November 8, just as the situation seemed to 
nearing its end, Hitler attempted his Beer I{all Putsch. The Berlin government 
responded to this by turning over Gessler's powers directly to Seeckt. The 
next morning, however, the Putsch was easily stopped by the Munich police. 
During the four months that Seeckt exercised executive powers a 
remarkable stabilization was achieved. The Weimar Republic was given another 
opportunity to succeed as a democratic government, even though this was 
achieved by extraordinary measures. The various separatist movements had been 
crushed, internal bickering among the parties was temporarily abandoned, and 
the ruinous inflation was checked. During January 1924 some National 
Socialists were involved in an assasination attempt on Seeckt because, as they 
said at their trial, he was "' as much of a national menace as the Jews. , ,,30 
29Gordon, Reichswehr, p. 236 has a translation of this verbal attack by th 
National Socialist newspaper. 
30rhe National Socialists later tried to suppress this fact. Robert G. L. 
Waite, Vanguard ~ Nazism (Cambirdge, Mass., 1952), p. 185. 
1, 
On February 13, 1924 Seeckt relinquished the p~Ners he held and the ordinary 
constitutional process was declared operative again. Seeckt refused the 
suggestion of some of his subordinates and friends that he remain as 
dictator.31 The zeal and decisiveness he brought to the tasks facing him in 
1923, the self-restraint employed, and the success obtained, mark this as the 
zenith of Seeckt's career. 
The death of Ebert in February 192, was followed by Hindenburg1s election 
to the presidency in M~. A new era seemed to be beginning for Germany, one 
in which she was again taking her place a.."Ilong the nations of Europe. The 
Locarno Pact was signed and relations with the West were much improved. The 
misunderstanding between Germany and Russia caused by the pact was resolved 
with the Berlin Treaty (April 24, 1926) which remained the basis of Russo-
German relations until 193,. In September 1926 Germany formally took her 
place in the League of Nations. This year of progress began happily for 
Seeckt with his promotion to Co1one1-General (highest rank in the Reichswehr), 
but ten months later he was no longer on active service. He resigned as Chief 
of the Army Command October 8, 1926. Nor was he in Germany when, three months 
later, the Allied Control Commission disbanded. He had devoted so much energy 
to this purpose, now that it was accomplished, it no longer had any personal 
meaning for him. 
The public motivation for his resignation was the furor raised by the press 
over the affair of the Prussian Prince. The facts are that Prince William of 
Prussia, eldest son of the former Crown Prince, was seen by a correspondent 
31Rabenau, Seeckt, P. 397. 
16 
taking part in the Reichswehr summer manoeuvers. Seeckt maintained that he 
was there only as an observer and that he was permitted to take part in some 
of the staff exercises only on the understanding that he be discreet in 
showing himself. However, he was seen by a reporter in uniform. giving an 
order to some soldiers. Seeckt accepted the responsibility for the incident. 
Press reaction to the fact that rqyalty was taking a role in the military was 
outspokenly hostile. Gessler made no attempt to help him over the demands for 
his dismissal. With no sign of support from those in power there was nothing 
to be done but comply. 
The deeper motivations behind the dismissal have not been thoroughly 
examined. It is inconceivable that Germanr's leading military figure should 
have been cashiered for What was, after all, a minor indiscretion and one 
that had happened pre~~ously. It is understandable that political enimies 
would utilize an opportune moment to rid themselves of an unwanted figure. 
But the question remains as to why' those in power decided at this particular 
moment to jettison Seeckt. Gordon presents a picture of gradually deteriorat-
ing relations between Gessler and Seeckt resulting in Gessler's determination 
to replace him.32 But the decision to dismiss Seeckt was certainly wider than 
this. Gatzke asserts that Strcsemann had no part in the matter but that he 
33 did not object. It would be illuminating in the study of the Weimar 
32 Gordon, Reichswehr, pp. 333-335. 
33Hans W. Gatzke, Stresemann and the Rearmament of Germagy (Baltimore, 
1954), pp. 60-61. - - -
--. 
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Republic to know exactly the forces that combined to bring about Seeckt's 
replacement. 
Seeckt himself knew no more than that the parties of the Left were 
against him. 34 He surmised that Hindenburg was behind the move but he felt 
that he had more political friends than enemies and that he would be able to 
play a furt.~er role in Germany in some government capacity. 35 Immediately 
after his resignation he left the country for a vacation. It was his hope 
that upon his return he would be inn ted to some responsible post for which 
his knowledge and experience would qualif,r him. Specifically he felt himself 
suited best for diplomatic service.36 In spite of the fact that he let it be 
known that he desired such a position, the government made no move to disturb 
his retirement. He did, however, obtain a minor advisory post in the 
Reichswehr Ministry which was probably meant to supplement his pension rather 
than give him an opportunity to help shape policy although his opinion was 
37 
sought from time to time. 
Seeckt's short career as a parliamentarian also rewAins to be investi-
gated. ~~ediately after his resigr.ation, Joseph Wirth tried to get him to 
join the Center Party but he refused saying he wanted no party label. 38 In th 
34Rabenau, Seeckt, p. 558. 
35 ~., pp. 547-548. 
36Ibid• 
37Ibid., p. 626. 
38Ib1d., pp. 627-628. This gave to rise to rumors of his conversion to 
Catho1iCISiii. 
18 
election of 1930 he decided to stand for the Reichstag as a member of the 
39 German People's Party. It was in the midst of a reorganization after 
stresemann's death and to Seeckt m~ have appeared to have a future. He 
worked very hard for election and toured the countr,r often making two or more 
40 
speeches in one day. Seeckt took his seat as one of his part,yls representa-
tives for the next two years.4l His record as a politician does not appear 
outstanding.42 
Seeckt, instead of becoming a state official, became at the end of his 
43 life a prolific writer. He took up residence in ~is beloved Berlin and 
embarked upon a liter~ career writing at first on milit~ topics. In 1927 
•• 
an article, "Modern Cavalr,r," appeared in the Militar-Wockenblatt. Most of 
his other military articles were published by the same journal. In 1929 he 
entered the esthetic and philosophical sphere b.Y writing a piece called 
ItRemembrances of Salzburg" for the Frankfurter Zeitung. In this same year 
also appeared his first three books. 
Antikes Feldherrntum (1929), a small work of thirty-five pages, dealt 
39Ibid., p. 652. 
40Ibid., p. 653. 
-
4lJohn W. Wheeler-Bennett, The Nemesis of Poner; ~ German !!3! .!!! 
Politics 19l8-.l21!2 (London, 1954J,p. 223. 1'here does not appear to be any 
evidence for the statement made here that he was re-elected in 1932. 
42w. M. Knight.Patterson, Germany; From Defeat to Conquest 1913-1933 
(London, 1945), pp. 474 and 484. This contains some-of his Reichstag-speeohes 
on military questions. 
43Rabenau, Seeckt, pp. 578-622. This contains a swmmary of twenty-six 
artioles and books which represent only a part of Seeckt's total work. 
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with military leadership. Alexander, Caesar, Hannibal, and Napoleon were 
presented as the prototypes of supreme commanders of grand strategy. In 
Gedanken eines Soldaten (119 pages), Seeckt presented the views of a military 
man on such topics as slogans, modern military problems, pacifism, imperialism 
and the need for leadership in the post-war period. The book was divided into 
a series of disjointed sections but it served as an excellent index to his 
most prominent ideas. The l~,rgest section of the work was clearly intended 
for the popular reader. The last work in 1929, ~ Zukunf't .2!! Deutsches 
Reiches (192 pages), examined the present needs for the German State in 
accordance with certain historical precedents and theoretical limitations. 
The whole sphere of the state was analysed and certain general and specific 
recommendations were set forth. 
Landesverteidiguns (94 pages), published in the following year, eXamined 
the whole problem of German defense in the modern context of mass warfare. 
The lessons of the World \~ar were presented in order to determine the way 
future wars might be fought. Here Seeckt also suggested the way in whioh a 
future German army should be constituted when the Treaty restrictions were 
abolished. 
In 1931 Seeckt published his historical study, Moltke ~ Vorbild (187 
pages), the result of his lifelong admiration of Bismarck's Prussian Chief of 
Staff. It was his best literar,y effort, we1l-const~Joted and well-written. 
The work served him as a vehicle for the presentation of his own military 
ideas. It was an apologia for his own work, thinly veiled as intellectual 
history, emphasizing the parallels between Moltkets time and his own. 
During the first year of the Nazi era Seeckt published two last books. 
20 
Die Reichs"t'lehr (140 pages), retold the history of the reconstruction of the 
-
German knmy after its defeat under the restrictions of the Treaty. Seeokt 
related the events in the third person, never imitating that he played ~ 
role in what he is describing. Deutschland zwischen ~ ~ ~ examined the 
orientation of GermanY's foreign policr.r. Each neighboring country was 
subjected to an exam.ination for its possible role in relation to the Reich in 
the coming power struggle between East and West. 
In 1932 the Chinese nationalist government requested a military advisor 
from Germany. Seeckt agreed to serve as an advisor to the mission and left 
for China in April 1933. However because of heart trouble he returned to 
Germany in August of the same year. He left again for China in Janu,ry 1934 
and remained there until I1arch 1935. His work in China was officially denied 
by the German government, but Seeckt "is regarded by some as having really 
laid the foundation for the organization of the modern Chinese Arrrry.n44 
In October 1935 Germany unilaterally declared the military prohibitions 
of Versailles at an end. The following year, on his birthday Seeckt received 
a congratulatory telegram from Hitler granting him the unusual honor of 
becoming the commander of his original regiment, the Alexander Grenadiers. 
Seeckt's life had come full Circle. His career ended in the regiment where it 
had begun. On December 27, 1936, about four o'clock in the morning Seeckt 
was found dead of a heart attack holding an Er~lish novel in his hands. 
4Uxurt Bloch, German Interests and Policies in the Far East, Institute of 
Pacific Relations Inquiry Series (Ne~ork, 1940);-p:-r~----
21 
Hi tIer' 5 perfunctory telegram of condolence to his widow read in part, "The 
Generaloberst will be remembered by posterity as a great soldier.,t4, Three 
days later a State funeral was held. •• HitlAr, Goring, and Blomberg accompanied 
the coffin to the Military Cemetary and as the coffin was 10w8r.ed into the 
gr~und, the band pl~ed the traditional Ich Hat ein Kamerad. 
- - - .;.;.;;~..-;; 
4'SOhmidt-Pauli, Seeokt, p. 191. 
CHAPTER II 
THE REICH 
Seecktt s ~ Future .2! .!:.!:!. German Empire (.ill:! Zukunft !!!! Reiches), 
published three years after his retirement, contains his major ideas on the 
state. Its subtitle, Postulates !E2 Criticisms (Urteile ~ Forderungen), 
made clear that he was less concerned with organizing a political system of 
his own than with the presentation and application of principles he considered 
relevant for the Reichts problems in this critical period of its development. 
He believed strongly that Germa~ needed practical policies of action for the 
I immediate future rather than more political theories. Any utopian or 
doctrinaire approach to political questions he rejected tot~ b.1 his 
insistance that the political process was one of organic development.2 
For Seeckt, concepts such as the Reich, nationalism, historicism, and 
individualism Here the central realities of political life. Within this 
IHans von Seeckt, The Future of the German ~mpire; Postulates and 
CriticisMS, trans. Oakley Williams "1"tOOdon, 1930 , p. 26. -
2Ibid., p. 53: "It is not difficult to conjure up a vision of an ideal 
State,~ functions of which are determined on what appear to be logical 
prinCiples, rut the State in which we are living is not a guinea-pig for 
vivisection b.Y theorists and we cannot afford the luxury, less than ever 
nowadays, of redUCing wrong tenets to absurdity for the instruction of their 
disciples. It Ibid., p. 10): "The fulfilment of the needs of the day in the 
course of natiOnil evolution, that is politics." 
22 
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framework he was able to take up what he thought to be the necessar,y reforms 
of the state institutions, the parliallentary and executi va powers, the 
relationship between the individual and the communit,r, police powers, 
economics, and cultural forces. 
At the heart of Seeckt's political thought was his idea of the Reich. 
English synonyms for this word are "realm, It "state," or "empire" and as a 
proper noun it has been commonly used to designate various former German 
states. Usually, however, Seeckt emplo,red the word in a more abstract and 
broad sense than this and it had for him a deeply emotional, almost mystical, 
significance. At the outset of !h! Future 2! ~ German Empire, Seeckt 
established his intention to give to the term "Reich" a wider connotation than 
merely that of a state, and in no w~ was it to be taken to represent the 
3 
existing state institutions. There is, he wrote, "something supersensuous" 
about this word, stemming as it does from the distant Roman past and 
continuing to exist even when it has been forbidden a political form, since 
even then "its being (Wesen) remains. n4 The Reich, he continued, existed in 
the material world as a political form of government, but it waS essentially 
"an organic living entity (Lebewesen), subject to the laws of evolution" 
which in his day was lIalmost the sole uncontested bond of unity" among the , 
German people. This word, then, was meant by him to signify the continuous 
3Ibid., p. 23. 
4Ibid. 
'Ibid. 
-
national spirit or soul of Germany in a very living and vital sense. 
24 
6 
Seeckt's Hegelian-like concept of Reich expressed primarily the national, 
and not political, character of the German people. His nationalism Has rooted 
in a belief in Deutschtum, the national genius, and he was confident it would 
accommodate itself successfully to the modern age of the nation-state. In 
viewing the thousand years of the Reich's existence, Seeckt saw that the unity 
of the nation had been spiritual and cultural rather than political, so that 
the nation was still trying in his own d~ to adapt a state to fit its 
7 particular needs. He emphasized, in the forward for the English translation 
of ~ Zukunft ~ Reiches, that non-Germans should not mistake this political 
inexperience for weakness, but understand that the national solidarity of the 
German people had alw~s been much greater than their political unity.8 He 
was certain that two traits in the German character, their willingness to 
undertake difficult tasks and their Itsound political instinct," would result 
in a successful conclusion to the domestic dangers of his own time.9 In 
particular, he characterized Prussia as the model for the construction of a 
German state because its sense of discipline and of individual service to the 
cormnuni ty had made it the most successful politically of the man;r German 
10 groups. 
6It is difficult to understand the reasons which caused the translator of 
Die Zukunft des Reiches to use invariably the Bismarckian "Empire" as the 
proper synonym for "Reich." 
7Ibid. , '0. 98. 
8 
..!.lli. , p. 15 • 
9Ibid. , p. 16. 
-10Ibid. p. 101. 
Seeckt rejected an internationalis~ which in trying to eradicate the 
natural national spirit of modern states would actually result in powerful 
states dominating the t1eak by using internationalism as a mask for their own 
aggressive nationalism.ll He admitted the existence of a co~~on European 
culture and thought that just as it was possible for states to co-operate in 
this sphere, a true international feeling based on a strong nationalism might 
emerge so that nations might share the best in their individual characters.12 
He welcomed the "wholesome If reaction that was growing in many countr:i ea 
besides Germany against the type of internationalism that meant to erase 
national characteristics.13 He cautioned, however, that unless the government 
tried to guide this growing nationalism into constructive channels, radical 
movements might seize power.14 Any such dictatorship, he felt, whether of the 
right or of the left, could never be truly national because they would look to 
politically-similar foreign allies in subjugating their fellow citizens.l > 
Seeckt identified the nation with a community of interests and never with 
a racial group. He realized that in the present phase of history nationality 
was important.16 However, his nationalism showed no trace of raCism, or in 
llIbid. , p. 148. 
l2Ibid• , pp. 13-14. 
l3.!~., p. 147. 
l4Ibid., p. 148. 
l>Ibid. , p. 146. 
l6Ibid• , p. 177. 
-
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particular anti_Semitism.17 Nor did he hold Pan-German views. He believed in 
the Bismarckian Reich which had excluded the Austrian Germans whose interests 
were not consistent with the new federation.1S He praised Bismarck's foreign 
policy as having taught "a healthy sense of nationality" by forcing Germans to 
uni te in a common cause 01' defense.19 He er1lici tly castigated those who 
dreamed of incorporating all ~iermans into one state as being unrealistic and 
deluded by the perennial chimera of the Holy Roman Empire of the German 
20 Nation. He believed, however, in a special "German mission" which was to 
export its culture to the world and to those who were in need of it. 21 
~ansion of territorial Germany was not at this time a practical possibility 
although he certainly was not against exploiting any opportunities that might 
develop. 22 In particular, he wished the return of the colonies. 23 But he 
felt that these were not the most important matters confronting Germany. '!tlhat 
was of particular urgency was the conservation of the Reich through the 
achievement of a national unity of nurpose in a truly German state. 24 
In speaking of preserving the Reich and not the Republic Seeckt was in no 
l?In his manY writiaps he attacked no groups on racial grounds and Gordon 
quotes Hitler's attack on him as a Jewish partisan; Harold J. Gordon, Jr., cf. 
The Reichswehr and the German Republic, 1919-1926 (Princeton, New Jersey, 19,7 
P:-236. - - - -
18Seeckt, Future £f ~ Empire, p. 99. 
19Ibid., p. 148. 
20rIans von Seeckt, Deutschland zwischen ~ ~ Ost (Hamburg, 1933), p. 
21I'qid., p. 7. 
22Ibid. 
23Ibid. 
• 97. 
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way implying an anti-republican outlook. Instead he was following the usage 
established by the authors of the Weimar Constitution. As they stated in its 
preamble and first article, the official name for Germany was the German Reich 
25 
and not the German Republic. In justifying the preservation in the 
Constitution of t."is a."Ilbiguous word "Reich" because of its intimate associa-
tion with the historical German desire for national unit,y, Hugo Preuss, its 
principal drafter, observed, liThe word, the thought, the principle of the 
Reich has for us Germans such deeply rooted emotional values that I believe we 
26 
cannot assume the responsibility of giving up this name. It Such an expressio 
of feeling coincided with Seeckt's own affection for the use of the word 
"Reich It as a concept prior in value to the form of its state. 
Nor did Seeckt's use of the word imply former imperial allusions. As a 
realist, Seeckt understood that the monarchy was irrevocably gone. He was, in 
fact, rather bitter that the Kaiser had abdicated in such an ignomonious 
27 fashion. He recognized the advantages that the mi1itar,r had enjoyed under 
the former reg~~ and he regretted their loss. But he was fully prepared to 
accept the Republic as long as it responded to what he considered to be the 
the needs of the Reich. 28 Whatever his suspicions or dislikes of the Republic 
25Arno1d Brecht, Federalism and Regionalism lE Germagr: ~ Division of 
Prussia (New York, 1945), p. 6: 'WTFie German Reich is a republic." 
26Koppe1 S. Pinson, Modern Germanr (New York, 1954), p. 402. 
27Hans von Seeckt, ~ Reichswehr (Leipzig, 1933), u. 16. 
28Seeckt, Future ~ Empire, p. 103. 
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mlrJ have b<;en, he was not a conscious monarchist and he had no tolerance for 
those within the Reichswehr who wished to work for its return. 29 
Seeckt was not overly concerned with any narticular form assumed by the 
state, that is, the Reich in its political sense. He felt that in accordance 
with past developments and present needs there were a variety of structural 
alternatives which the state might employ to fulfill its goal of promoting 
30 individual and community welfare. The form of the state was simply an amora 
means to an end and the manner in which results were achieved was a question 
of style.31 He equated good government with successful government regardless 
of how it was organized. 32 The fact that he called his chapter on the 
structure of the state "The Machinery" indicated his feeling that the type of 
government was of secondary importance. 
He acknowledged that there were general prinCiples of successful govern-
ment, but he felt that their doctrinaire application without regard for the 
individual circumstance was certain to harm the vitality of the state.33 For 
Seeckt, the only absolute principle was the "organic law of evolution" which 
29Qordon, Reichswehr, pp. 307-308. 
30Seeckt, Future.2! Empire, p. 25 and 175. 
3lIbid., P. 175: "These forms are suhject to historical evolution and of 
themselves are~ neither good nor bad; you :'1ight call them ••• mutable forms of 
style, of which nothing more is asked than that they do not mar the main plan.' 
32Ibid., p. 122. 
-
33Ibid., p. 97. 
29 
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operated through a "struggle for life." This idea of systematic development 
of organisms was his basic philosophical position and certainly not an 
uncommon one for a ;nan of his generation. Such a doctrine of "the incessant 
nux of thingslt resulted in a thorough-going political relativism. 35 
Poli tic al forms are of no more supernational, than of supertemporal, 
value. To rea'ize this insures us against a mistaken conservatism 
looking for eternal verities in mutable forms. State institutions, 
organizations, legal codes have in themselves, no everlasting 
worth. They have grown up, are in being today, and are subject to 
change in the future.36 
He reasoned that, even though it was an unpopular idea, the "histOrically 
logical consequences 'If past happenings" limited man's freedom of meaningful 
action. 31 He believed, however, that this evolutionar.y process could be 
directed by "the man of actionlt who had a true understanding of lithe 
continuity of the past to which the future is fatefully linked.,,38 The leader 
who had "served the term of his apprenticeship and pupillage in History" 
could co-operate with the movements and forces of the past and so guide the 
course of the present.39 It was through the stuQy of history that man 
achieved some measure of freedom by teaching him where "the laws of being and 
34Ibid., p. 20 and 25. 
35Ibid• , p. 25. 
36Ibid• 
-
31Ibid., p. 19. 
38Ibid• , p. 20. 
-
39Ibid., p. 21. 
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growthll were 1eading.40 i'1an could do as he wished but his actions, however 
understandable or even praiseworthy, were fruitless if done tlin opposition to 
the organic law of evolution. ,,41 He demanded that the leader be a realist 
who did what was possible within the historical situation and he dismissed the 
idealist as a positive danger. 42 
To Seeckt, history was not a speculative study but a practical method for 
determining a course of action. His historicism, however, did not concern 
itself with guessing the future, a pursuit he called "labour lost.,t43 Just as 
he did not believe in political theory producing successful government 
policy, so he did not have aqy hope in actions based on prophesies.44 He 
added, however, that since present affairs would affect future generations, 
action had to be responsibly undertaken with an understanding of their back-
ground and consequences.45 Thus, he concluded, the conservative and liberal 
were natural and complementar,r partners in maintaining and fostering the 
vitality of the Reich.46 
Although he made no forecasts of the political future, the quality of 
40Ibid., p. 22. 
41Ibid., P. 20. 
-
42Ibid. 
43Ibid. , p. 21. 
44Ibid., p. 19. 
-
45Ibid• , p. 22. 
-
46Ibid., p. 22-3. 
31 
his historical sense can be judged from what he considered to be the signifi-
cant factors in Germany's political past and his assessment of the problems 
, 
and historical forces present in 1929. The basic fact he wrote, in Germany's 
political development was the unbalanced growth of its nation and state.47 By 
this he meant that the long, continuous history of factional strife among the 
German people caused the Reich to evolve into a state more slowly than other 
48 European countries. The final success of this growth was dependent upon the 
development of a cammon political unity within the German nation. Seeckt saw 
this beginning in Napoleon's dissolution of the Holy Roman Empire in 1803 and 
the consequent regrouping of the German states culminating in Bismarck's 
Reich of 1871, an imperfect dynastic federation but another large advance 
towards a truly German state.49 The Weimar Republic, in his opinion, had not 
made any significant further progress in the evolution of political unity.50 
He characterized his period in history as fla turning-point of Time.,,51 
The First World War and the Revolution had thoroughly disrupted the 
maturation of German unity but he did not consider this to be the beginning of 
!tan entirely new epoch. 1t52 Even so great a debacle as the war did not destroy 
47Ibid. , 
-
p. 15. 
48Ibid., p. 15-16 and 98. 
-
49Ibid., p. 98-99. 
5Orbid., p. 99-100. 
51Ibid., p. 20. 
-
52Ibid., 
-
p. 42. 
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the basic laws of evolution although it did redistribute the balance of 
historical forces, most notably the heightening of nationalism in all 
countries. 53 The problem for Germany was to make this a cohesive movement 
instead of a divisive one. Seeckt identified the present with a struggle for 
national unity in the face of ten years of internal unrest. Although the 
"German nation has yet to live itself into its new State and conciliate 
domestic antagonisms" he was confident that at some future time "the common 
factor will beoome a matter of course and Germany will resume the course of 
quite evo1ution.,,54 He oonceived the "urgentll task before the contemporary 
politician to be the oonservation of Germany as a political unit,r.55 
Seeokt designated some of the general prinoip1es necessar,y to the 
evolution of the Reich's political unity as the gradual reduction of the 
mk~ber of German states, the strengthening both of the executive and of local 
government, the oonstant reduction of bureaucraoy, the reform of the 
parliamentary system, and the priority of the oommon good. 
He envisioned the ultimate goal of political unity as a federal union of 
unit states (Einheitsstaat) to be achieved by the gradual reduotion of the 
total number of German states (Lander). He divided these various states into 
three groups: the large, vital states capable of growth (only Prussia was so 
54 Ibid., p. 17-18. 
-
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designated); intermediate states which justif,r their continuing separate 
exi stence, and the "historical keepsakes lt that serve no purpose at all and are 
ultimate~ destined to be absorbed within the first group.56 Reforms based on 
this evolutionary principle of "State simolification," Seeckt cautioned, had 
to await the needs of actual future conditions before they could be carried 
out.
57 Although it would be a long time before this was accomplished, the 
politicians had "to quicken and to facilitate i t.,,58 Seeckt believed that 
such an integration would eventually and inevitablY develop but to attempt to 
compel a new grouping of states "by way of Parliamentary force majeure" 1,;01~ld 
hinder true German unity. 59 
Prussia embodied in a special way for Seeckt all that he honored about 
the Reich. To show that Prussia had the right flto enlargement and hegemony 
within the Empire" he described the special qualities of this "model of the 
State in itself. 1I60 
Not constructed on alien models, never having shed a closely knit 
tribal community, but created by, and developed from the State 
idea itself, Prussia attaches organicallY all particles within the 
range of its magic power of attraction to itself without destroy-
ing their characteristics, but by making them subserve the weal 
of the realm, that stiffened the rich, but soft and versatile 
German Kultur life by the strictUf'!SS of its sense of duty; the 
56Ibid., p. 99. 
57Ibid• 
-
59Ibid., 102-103. 
-
6Orbid., 101. 
-
<"~ 
--
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only German State that knew how to acquire new territory for the 
German genius (Deutschtum), the social state in its truest sense, 
because, if it inexorably demanded the devotion of the 
individual to the State, it was at all times prepared to place 
the might of the State at the service of the peop1e.6l 
He left no doubt that Prussia would "gradually absorb and incorporate the 
small States that come within its geographical and political orbit" and 
believed that Gennan unity would be served by the eventual absorption of all 
the three types of states "into the fim Prussian State union. ,,62 Such was 
his solution to a perplexing problem which he blamed the Weimar government 
for not solv1ng.63 He believed in a political centralization of power within 
the proven and viable PruBsian state. 
Seeckt meant this centralization to be federal in character because the 
Prussian experience had proved the beneficial effects of sharing authority 
between the central and local governments.64 Centralizing tendencies were, he 
thought, inherent in the modern state's need Ilof rationalizing administrative 
work and of facilitating routine control" in its promotion of the common 
good.65 The areas in which only the central government operated were foreign 
affairs and the armed forces.66 In all other areas, he maintained, the centr 
61Ibid. 
-
62Ibid., 
-
p. 103. 
63Ibid. 
64Seeckt, Future, 105. 
65Ibid., p. 108. 
-
66 Ibid. , 
-
p. 105. 
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goverrunent must be confined lito laying down general lines, to supervising, to 
conciliating and to lending a helping hand. 1I67 His view of sound centraliza-
tion was based on the self-administration by local units of general state 
policies. Seeckt believed that the cause of unity was served by giving as 
much local authority as possible to the various states but he did not offer 
any concrete program of reform to implement such a general principle. 
Overcentralization, in his 'liew J was a dominant characteristic of the 
i~eimar Republic which had "imposed ever-increasing duties on itself in the 
mistaken view that it ought itself to work for the welfare of its citizens, 
whereas its function is to take steps to enable them to reach this standard of 
welfare by their own exertions, and then to watch over and protect them in 
this state of prosperity. 1168 By assuming the burden of what ought to be left 
to the several states, the Heimar Republic had created an "atrophied, 
lymphatic bureaucracy" whose members were actually "only governing and direct-
ing one another.,,69 He criticized the civil service for having become 
impersonal, unrealistic in its remoteness from actual needs, restricted by the 
"curse of red tape," bound to mediocrity, and most particularly, politically 
70 
appointed. In contrast to the present civil servants he praised those who 
remained on their jobs during the November revolution of 1918 because they 
71 proved themselves servants of the state and not of a political part.y. He 
67Ibid. , p. 111. 
68Ibid., p. Ill. 
-
69Ibid. , p. 112. 
7OJ:bid. , p. 113-114. 
71~.J p. 115. 
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fel t that the parliamentary system primarily was responsible for the growth 
of the 'tleimar bureaucracy since party politics have need of patronage. 72 His 
solution to the problem of excessive bureaucracy was again the principle of 
self-administration on the part of local units of government who would best 
73 know how to deal with their own affairs. 
That parliamentar,y government had fostered bureaucracy was only one of 
the reasons he was against it. Fundamentally he felt that a parliament was 
incapable of governing proper~ because it would represent party strength and 
not national interest. 74 Tne democratic notion that parliament expressed the 
wishes of the people was illusory because, he believed, people were 
unconcerned with specific politioal issues.75 He admitted that there was 
such a thing as the peoples' will on grave, general issues so that elections 
usually were based on the simplification of such issues through the use of 
76 
slogans. But the Weimar parli&~ent did not even reflect this, he thought, 
because the proportional s,ystem of election, intended to give a voice to 
minori ty interests, only severed th.e contact between the electorate and the 
candidates.77 His conclusion was that the party leader in parliament might 
72Ibid., p. 116. 
-
73Ibid., 
-
p. 116-117. 
74Ibid., p. 122. 
-
75Ibid., 
-
p. 118-119. 
76Ibid., p. 118. 
-
77Ibid., p. 120. 
-
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just as well cast a vote representing the number of members of his part,y and 
to thus acknowledge the "unqualifi ed triumph of numbers. It 78 
Seeckt did not mean by this that parliament did not have useful work to 
do or that individual deputies did not represent at times the interests of the 
nation. He acknowledged that the party system in a parliament was "the 
natural sequel to the people's participation in political life. It 79 But he 
repudiated the idea of majority rule as "the absolute domination of numbers" 
80 
and contrary to true democracy which insured the rights of minorities. 
Government by a parliament of part,y influences could never serve the interest 
of the whole nation. 
The proper function of a parliament was not to legislate but to advise 
and guide the leader of the state by helping him with their special knowledge 
of the national needs. He thought that parliament's task was not to make laws 
but to be a center for publio opinion and as the people became more 
politically experienced, the more would the government have to acoept the 
81 
advioe of the parliament which represented them. Seeokt was vague on the 
matter of testing parliL~ent's representation of the people but he did suggest 
that a means other than "the arithmetical" be found. 82 Parliai'Tlentwas, he 
78Ibid• 
79Ibid. 
-
80Ibid., p. 121. 
-
81Ibid• , p. 122 and 171. 
-
82Ibid., p. 122. 
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said, "conscious of its own incapacity to rule and to govern" since in times 
of crisis it in'Tariably tended to look for a strong man or allowed the mob to 
83 
seize power. He summed up the functions of a parliament as "supporting, 
counselling and keeping a watch on a State direction that has the people's 
confidence behind it.,,84 
Parliamentar,y government was the chief cause for the ten years of post-
war political instability and the main remedy was to free the executive from 
parliamentar,y majorities. The need for executive leadership was founded on 
the basic principle "underlying all forms at all times" which is that of "the 
worth and value attached to personality. 1,85 He cited If the triumph of 
democratic and pseudo-democratic" forms of government as the cause for unrest 
and revolution in the modern world which both illustrated lithe incapacity of 
mob rule" and demonstrated the need for personal leadership in those very 
86 
states which had repudiated it. The necessit.1 of personal rule may exist 
only in the abstract and not be committed to any particular individual, but he 
insisted, "The sense of incapaCity to rule, for the most part unconscious and 
rarely admitted, is inherent in the mob, and in the hour of danger this sense 
rises to terror; mass terror leads to panic, to cha.os--or to lea.dership.II B7 
83Ibid., p. 123. 
84Ibid. 
85Ibid., p. 176. 
--
86Ibid• 
87Ibid., p. 177. 
-
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The concluding chapter of ~ Future 2!. .!:!:!! German Empire amplified his 
views on the nature of political leadership and made clear that every 
properly functioning state conformed to the principle of a strong and 
88 independent executive. Seeckt was purposefully vague in defining the 
limitations on the powers of the head of the state because theory could not 
dictate the needs of the historical moment. However, he did concede that 
there should be some unspecified constitutional safeguards on the personality 
of the leader exceeding his office.90 But he gives no indication that he 
could even conceive of the possibility of a willful and perverse individual 
gaining power. Whatever the limitations, a wide latitude must obtain so that 
the executive was free to take the necessary action in emergencies and to 
91 
oversee the nation as a whole. 
This ability to represent the entire people and their interests was a 
special attribute of the head of state and one that no par1ia~entary system 
could emulate. To personifY his nation was the primary responsibility of the 
1eader.92 In previous times this had not alw~s been the case, so that he 
wrote, !tIt is only the historical deve10nment of the sense of nationality that 
88Ibid., p. 176. 
89Ibid., 180. 
9Orbid., p. 180: "Trust on the one side and a sense of responsibility on 
the other furnish more trustworthy limitations than legal documents." 
91Ibid., p. 181. 
92Ibid• 
-
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has made this postulate a matter of course. • Such a representation, 
in the person of the executive, of lithe State as a nation" was a very 
important check to an unsound internationalism, and which a victorious 
poli tician bound to represent his own particular party' might not be able to 
94 
carry out. The head of state could not be expected to break his own 
convictions or ties of association but he must be prepared to foster and 
integrate a wide variet,y of differing interests \~thin the nation excepting 
only those that would do violence to the very existence of the state.95 He 
must be above but equidistant from all.96 
He professed no interest in whether this leadership would take the form 
of dictator, king, or president, as this was a question solved Qy the Reich's 
evolution.97 ~ihatever the form, he argued, the head of state must not be 
responsible to majorities, as in the case of a parliamentary leader, but must 
9R 
be "responsible to himself and, what is the same thinp:,to his people alone." 
Because of the very fact. 0f the leader's burdensome responsibility', lithe man 
99 
of des'tinylt was often driven to assume this office. He believed that such 
a man, even thougn he made mistakes, cannot be discharged because he ha.d made 
93Ibid., p. 177. 
94rbid., :1. 179. 
-
95Ibid• 
-
96Ibid., p. 178. 
-
97Ibid., p. 176. 
98Ibid., p. 182. 
-99Ibid. 
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them for the common welfare. He stated that it was the trulY democratic 
state with its shared responsibilit.y that had the greatest need for the single 
centralizing personality in whom its unit.y was crystallized.10l The people 
must trust their leader and in return he must subordinate his own feelings to 
102 
his assumption of responsibility for the cammon good. 
Seeckt's conception of the head of the state being often an exceptional 
individual with wide latitude of powers to accomplish his tasks found the 
limitation of his freedom in the demands of the nation. The issue of 
individual freedom and the power of the state is likewise resolved b.Y an 
appeal to the common good. The source and goal of the state, according to 
Seeckt, is the individual, and the individual's freedom, was a right which 
must be guaranteed as far as possible since the individual is the basic unit 
of society without which there would be no state.lO) 
But since the state had a wider responsibility than to the single 
individual, it must interfere with his rights in the interests of the whole 
104 
communit.y. Restraints on personal freedom should be as few as possible in 
normal Circumstances, but dictatorial powers might be justified by a time of 
105 
crisis. Such exceptional laws must be done away with as soon as the 
immediate danger is past since their existence is an indication of basic 
lOOrbid., p. 182. 
-
10lIbid., p. 183. 
-
102 Ibid. 
-
lO3Ibid., 1'. 108 and 163. 
-104Ibid., p. 164 and 165. 
-105Ibid., p. 165. 
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106 governmental unsoundness. Seeckt examines property, security, and free 
speech as fundamental rights of the citizen, and yet in each case what is 
discussed is the necessit,y of state interference in these rights. 
In every case Seeckt resolved the perennial IIstruggle between freedom and 
107 the State" by emphasizing the priority of the common good. In theory 
Seeckt saw the importance of personal freedom but when it came to a practical 
assessment of how that freedom worked, the result, except in the case of 
economics, was the integration of the individual into the common good. He 
solved the problem of freedom and power in the voluntary acquiescence by a 
"free" communitu of individuals in all that was needed for the domestic and 
108 
foreign strength of the Reich. It would appear that Seeckt regarded the 
individual as being meaningful only as a part of societ.y and not in his own 
right. The Reich, and not theoretical individual rights, are emphasized in 
Seeckt's thought. Questions of personal freedom are invariably approached 
from the point of view of social obligation. He did not believe that there 
109 
were anY rights or laws of justice which were absolute. He based his 
theory of law on the strength of the state to carry out what were the 
110 
particular needs of the nation. He characterized as weak, codes of law 
that were adhered to slavishly while the national good suffered and praised 
l06Ibid. , p. 94. 
107Ibid., p. 165. 
-
108Ibid., p. 165. 
-
109Ibid. , p. 91. 
-
llOrbid. , p. 92. 
-
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the English example of unwritten law. 
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Seeckt, in speaking of the securit,y of the individual, underlined that 
this is not primarily a question of right or law but of the police power of 
112 the state. He excused questions of excesses qy the police as the 
unfortunate results of enforcement.113 He repeated here that if the state 
did not interfere in this area of public order that the law of competition 
would result in harmful anarchy.114 In return for domestic peace, the citizen 
must voluntarily submit his freedom to the strength of the state. 
The right of free speech must be maintained qy the state because, Seeokt 
believed, conflict was a law of nature and hence tithe suppression of its 
expression leads to the danger either of stagnation or of exp1osion.,,11.5 
Restraints, in his opinion, were to be imposed not from fear of differences of 
opinion, which he regarded as a heal thy sign of civic participation in the 
work of the state, but because it created a dangerous impression of weakness 
116 
which foreign powers might misinterpret. He cautioned the reader that sine 
it was action and not debate which caused responsibility, that once a course 
lllIbid., 
-
p. 93. 
112Ibid., p. 169. 
113Ibid., p. 131-
114Ibid., 
-
p. 55. 
ll.5Ibid., p. 171. 
-
116Ibid., 
-
p. 170-171. 
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of action had been decided upon by the government, debate on the matter ceased 
117 to have any meaning. In this area he was not concerned with the private 
expression of opinion but only with its publio utterances, especially by 
parliament. 
It was in the realm of property rights that Seeckt was most reluctant to 
push his conception of state interposition for the cammon good. He believed 
that it was here that the state had to be most cautious in maintaining the 
public interest because the "whole property-owning stratum of the nation" was 
the foundation of the state's very existence.118 The virtue of this class was 
its "diligence, thrift, enterprise, initiative, and sense of responsibilityfl 
to which the state must give free scope and whose success enabled the 
financially unproductive state through taxation to obtain the funds necessar,r 
119 for its operation. The danger that Seeckt saw was that the period of 
inflation and deflation caused by post-war conditions, the demands of 
reparations, the over-expansion of state services, and the orushing tax 
structure had alienated the very class that the state must depend upon to 
120 function. The resulting resentment and resistance on the part of the peop1 
who showed such a high spirit of sacrifice during the war made Seeckt warn of 
grave future consequences.12l High taxes throttle the industrious and only 
l17Ibid., p. 172. 
-
l18Ibid., p. 168. 
-
l19Ibid., p. 166. 
-
l20~., p. 167. 
l21llWl., p. 167. 
45 
aggravate the condition of a weakening economy. Prf;Tate enterprise for profit 
which utilized the valuable principle of the worth of the personality must be 
122 fostered b,y the government. 
The right of property, as all other rights, must yield to the prior 
right of the community. The principle involved in this area, and Seeckt 
called its understanding of highest importance, is this: 
Competition, the struggle for life, which Nature has laid down 
as a law, cannot and must not be eliminated from economic life, 
we need it to encourage efficiene,y; but it is the function of 
the State to confine this struggle within the bounds set by 
the weal of the community and to prevent the uneconomic 
oppression of the weak by the abuse of the superior strength of 
the stronger.123 
In interfering in economic matters the state must be careful not to restrict 
private enterprise and limit itself to a constructive and protective 
124 
approach. 
For this reason Seeokt rejected a state planned economy which would only 
result in stagnation and lack of individual initiative, and favored instead a 
temporary state assistance to the producer with the view to eventual 
125 independence. He recalled that Germaqr had been forced b,y adverse condi-
tions during the war to set up extreme state controls but some "fanatics of 
organizationtl regarded this temporary but necessary evil as a model state 
122Ibid., p. 49. 
-
123Ibid., p. 55. 
-
l24Ibid., p. 48. 
-
125Ibid., p. 37. 
-
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126 economy. Even more did he repudiate socialism which he dismissed as 
127 intellectually nothing more than a slogan. Socialism, in his definition, 
was Itthe endeavour to place all economic resources, including capital and 
128 property, entirely under the custody of the State." This idea he found 
economically wrong because the state was unable to create but only use values, 
and false politically in that the state was not meant to be omnipotent but 
129 could only multiply a useless bureaucracy. The ultimate danger to the stat 
of such ideas wore that they could not, as their proponents believed, be 
130 stopped short of their logical end which he saw as Bolshevism. Such move-
ments as Russian Communism were pernicious because they were religious dogmas 
131 which appeal to the masses who "do not think, but believe. It At the other 
extreme there existed the peril of private monopolies which can never be 
tolerated because of their control of the necessities of life.132 
The economic problem of his day was not what changes should be made in 
the German economy but how the state could restore her sound pre-war 
133 
economy. Protective tariffs were necessar,y to revive ma~ home industries 
l26Ibid., p. 46, an obvious reference to General Erich von Ludendorff and his ideas of the total state. 
l27Ibid., p. 53. 
-
128Ibid., 
-
p. 58. 
129Ibid., 
-
p. 59. 
13Drbid., p. 61. 
-
131Ibid., p. 61-
-
132Ibid., p. 48. 
-1.33Ibid. • 42. 
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but the fundamental difficulty was Germany's reliance on foreign capital which 
134 
;.TaB making her increasingly Ita Colonial territory of international capital." 
German industry could never be sound until it was wholly controlled by 
Germans. He did not question the continuance of reparation payments, as much 
as this made recovery impossible, because this was a political and not 
economic question and one which had nothing to do with justice, but with 
13.5 power of which Germany was bereft. 
Although Germany had been industrially autonomous before the war she had 
136 been dependent upon the importation of foreign foodstuffs. Her acceptance 
of the "monstrous conditions of peace lt forced by the blockade which was to 
serve as the chief sanction employed in future international disputes meant 
to Seeckt that Germany would be defenseless unless it had a self-sufficient 
137 food supply. This was a political consideration he maintained that was 
138 
above all party bickering. In formulating a state agricultural poltcy, he 
wrote, "Everything must be subordinated to the one objective; to the 
restoration of liber~ to the Empire by enabling it to li~e on its own 
resources ••• n139 
l34Ibid., p. 4.5. 
-
l3.5Ibid. 
l36Ibid., 
-
p. 31. 
l37Ibid., p. 32-33. 
l38Ibid., p. 33. 
-
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He believed that to achieve this end the state must employ protective 
tariffs, loans, and credits but once the point of an adequate supply unsupporte( 
140 by imports was reached then this assistance must be withdrawn. When this 
condition had been attained, he saw the normal task of the state as being the 
elimination of surpluses and the maintenance of prices and profits adequate for 141 both producer and consumer. He realized that in practice this would be 
difficult and that the state was powerless to legislate prosperity, but he was 
hopeful that by concentrating on the individual farmer's ini tiati ve it would be 
142 
successful. He cited approvingly the experience of the United States as an 
example of how the state was able to direct l'Tith remarkable success the develop-
14.3 ment of their farm econ~ along the lines of cooperatives. 
An example of what Seeckt meant by state interference for the national 
welfare was his solution to the problem of the larger Junker estates in 
144 
northern Germany. The Peoplet s Party, of which Seeekt became an elected 
representative, was inexorably opposed to aqy suggestion that they be split up. 
Yet Seeckt's position in this matter was that large landholdings should be 
broken up if the" were not productive and placed in the hands of those who 
would make them useful for the nation, alluding to the example of Prussia in 
l40rbid., p. 34-37. 
-
l41Ibid., p. 34-5. 
l42Ibid., p. 38-39. 
-. 
l4.3Ibid. , p. 40. 
-
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-
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145 
colonizing unused land. His application of the principles of national need 
and historical development provides a fair example of his method of approaching 
problems. 
Seeckt understood that the problem of economic freedom was coupled with 
that of social justice. In this area, the state must achieve "the highest 
146 possible well-being of the sum total of its citizena. 11 He pointed out that 
this had nothing to do with the utopian idea of equal prosperity for all since 
the natural human condition presupposed inequality.147 He affirmed that the 
duty of the state was not to limit the competitive struggle which produces 
wealth but to provide the means of Itself-help" by which the "general level of 
well-beinglt might be raised by the weaker citizens themselves.148 
He realized, however, that modern developments in industrialization had 
made it necessary for the state to undertake social services that formerly were 
done by the economically stronger in the community. In his opinion it was 
"undesirable but unavoidable" that the state care for the Sick, the aged, arrl. 
those unable to work, as well as to supervise the condi tiona of employment, 
149 such as hours of work and child labor. Seeckt limited the state's interven-
tion in the social sphere with two principles. The first was that direct aid 
such as a dole to those in need was to be avoided so that the individual. did 
146Ibid., p. 54. 
-
147Ibid. 
-
148Ibid., p. 55. 
-
,0 
not lose his incentive and become a permanent burden to society but that he be 
cared for by his family, his neighbors, the local community, and, in particular, 
1,0 
worker's organizations. The second principle was that social sel"'rices 
should never exceed the ability of the taxp83'er to maintain them or the source 
l~ 
of aid, along with the state, would be irreparably harmed. He recognized 
the difficulty in obtaining social justice without unbalancing economic 
freed. om but his principles for achieving this are open to various interpreta-
tions. 
The state had a reluctant role to play in the social welfare of the nation 
but it had a positive obligation to be a promoter of its cultural forces. The 
first of these Was the ethical one of public morality in which both the state 
and churches co-operated for their mutual ~nefl t. Seeckt distinguished 
between religion, the individual's 1" esponse to the "supersensuous," and the 
church, an historical institution which "held out the saving hand of dogma •• 
to uncharted religious individualism.,,1'2 He saw no conflict hetween religion 
and the state since both were concerned with a strong ethical spirit in 
society.l'3 As far as the cht~ches were concerned, the rise of the national 
states had occasioned the growth of state churches, a situation he deplored 
l'Orbid., 
-
p. 57. 
151Ibid., p. ,8. 
-
l'2Ibid. , p. 66. 
-
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-
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because the state had no concern with doctrines and the church's interest was 
beyond pOlitics.154 In the promotion of religion the state must regard the 
various churches with tolerance which, even if it was not one of the principles 
of modern times, it would still have to be affirmed.155 
The state had the duty of promoting the work of religion and this meant of 
the creeds in which it was emobided.156 The only rese.r'Vation he attached to 
this material assistance was the same that all citizens must observe, and that 
was to foster the stability of the state.157 B.r calling Germany a Christian 
state Seeckt meant that the state reflected the moralit.1 of its citizens and 
not that the state was in any way Christian.158 He recognized that churches 
were "political associations" because they existed for the protection of their 
coreligionists, and he saw the Roman Catholic Church in particular as having 
international political significance. 16o The state, he believed, could 
accommodate to this but the state must never forget that it alone was the "em-
bod1ment, representati va and controller" of the spiritual interests of its 
l54Ibid., 
-
p. 68. 
l55Ibid. 
-
l56Ibid., 
-
p. 69. 
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161 people. He concluded that conflict in this area would be avoided if both 
realized that they were fulfilling the same duty but on different p1anee.162 
He makes no comment ~n other ethical Groups, such as the Teutonic Christians or 
the Masons, omitting them from any official place in the state. 
Religion was a part of the citizen's formation but another equally 
iJnportant area of that cultivation \las education. In education, as religion, 
the state w~ able to promote the material aspects but the non-material were 
beyond its scope.163 He believed that the state could ensure the development 
of students with average mentality but that it was incapable of instilling 
genius into men of talent.164 The most it could do was to provide opportunitie 
for such individuals to reach their maximum 1imits.165 He believed that 
education was not primarily meant for practical purposes but for the cultural 
166 broadening of the entire person. However, for the state, the most important 
result of the classroom, was to stamp its students with the national 
167 
character. 
16lIbid., p. 71. 
-
162Ibid. 
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He stated that the sole responsibllit,y for education must lie with the 
state since it is as much an asset as its material resourees.168 Seeckt 
realized that from this claim there arose three dange~sl part,y politics being 
introduced into the schools, governmental bureaucrae.y destroying the spirit of 
education by its insistance on a deadening uniformit,y, and the temptation to 
make education a state monopolY closing off equally valid education from other 
169 
sources. The higher the eduoational level, the more the state should with-
draw its direct oontrol leaving the initiative to the discretion of the school 
officials themselves.170 He saw this as being especially true in respect to 
allowing universities complete freedom to do as they saw fit, because they 
ln played such a distinctive role in molding societ,y. It Should be noted that 
nowhere does he give any state institution so much freedom. 
Science likewise he plaoed beyond the control of the state since ita 
results are for the benefit of all mankind.172 Although the state wOlud 
ultimately derive some practical benefit from it, soienoe existed for its own 
173 
sake. It was international but it cryuld only develop in a national setting 
l68Ibid., p • 71. 
.......... 
l69Ibid., p. 74-76. 
l70rbid., p • 77. 
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174 
and the state had the duty to foster this part of its spiritual strength. 
Art was more "earthbound" than science since it was a reflection of the time in 
which it existed and, hence, political life strongly influenced and sometimes 
175 
used it. Writing especially reflected political conditions, and the state 
must not make the mistake of trying to interfere or set up an official 
176 literature. Nor should it attempt to censor literature directly since 
enough laws existed for the protection of "public order and security.tt177 
He characterized censorship boards as absurdities because their members could 
not help but be prejudiced and they should in any case be rendered superfluous 
178 by the existing legal code and the magistrates. The strong state, he 
believed, did not have to be afraid of Criticism or laughter and those who 
"pander to the sensation of the moment will quickly disappear. 11179 In particu-
lar, political interference, with its party politics and bureaucratic 
faVOrites, was to be avoided although the state within limitations (to support 
"'circenses'" the state had to have enough '" panis' It) should endeavour to help 
180 the artist. 
174Ibid• 
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In his discussion of the spiritual and creative forces of German culture 
he included what he called the state's "humanitarian duties. n181 In this 
section he spoke of the charitable institutions of private individuals and of 
the churches, because of modern economic developments, passing into the 
impersonal hands of the state social services.182 However, he was proud of the 
fact that the state had incorporated wi thin itself the "historic mission of the 
183 
Church" in the preservation of public health. His consideration of this 
topic omitted its negative side such as hospitals and old people's homes and 
instead concentrated on the Single positive aspect of physical exercise. He 
felt that the contemporary enthusiasm for sports was a healthy substitute for 
forbidden militar,r physical training and should be supported by the state for 
that reason.184 He regretted that so much emphasis was placed upon individual 
honors and less on team competition which he believed was better training in th 
duties of the citizen.185 
Seeckt's political philosophy was not composed of aI\Y'th.ing original or 
startling. The evolutionary and historicist ideas were common to m8f\Y' writers 
of his time. So too was the nationalism and the heavy emphasis on social 
discipline. His adaptation of laissez faire economics to the twentieth century 
18lIbid., p. 87. 
182Ibid. 
-
184rbid., p. 89. 
185 ~., p. 90. 
situation is almost sentimental in its fervor. The distinctive facet of his 
thought lies not in its content but in the manner in which it is expressed. 
He was an epigrammatic writer, expressive in his allusions, and giving the 
l;n:press:1.on of a great breadth of knowledge. He had a sense of humor and of 
satire coupled with a sincerity that engendered interest on the part of the 
reader. H.ls thought was authoritarian but he was no fanatic. In the mind of 
a crude or shallow person, these were not harmless ideas. As expressed by' 
Seeckt, they had style and point. A reader might imagine them in the mind of a 
De Gaulle, but never of a Hitler. 
-- . 
--
CHAPTER III 
THE PHILOSOPHY OF FORCE 
Seeokt's belief in a universal law of the asoendency of the strongest in a 
competitive world made him, in his political writings, concerned above all 
with matters of force. In the post-war oontext of Oeman disunity and 
isolation, it was not strange that a soldier writing of contemporary political 
problems should focus his attention primarily upon the state's ability to 
preserve itself through its police and militar,r powers. His practioal approaoh 
to such questions resulted in the point of view that in reality the state was 
not oonstituted in SCllt9 abstract legality, but that its legitimacy derived 
from the maintenance of its existence against internal and external enemies. 
For these reasons, power relationships within and without the state were of 
particular importanoe in his thought. And the logical conclusion of these 
ideas was his conception that the well-ordered state was a power state whose 
sovereignt.1 and well-being existed onl1 through the presence and exercise of 
force. In setting forth his ideas on these matters, the present chapter will 
summarize his justification of force as law, the use of the state's enforce-
ment powers I the primacy of foreign policy, the necessity' of war, the universal 
obligation of military service, and finally, his concrete appraisal of the 
Versailles Peace Treaty and analysis of the European situation of his day. 
Seeckt's philosophy of force rested upon his belief that actual power and 
not theoretical right bestows authority. Fundamental in this regard and 
57 
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consistent with his historicism was his denial of the existence of aqy absolute 
1 
or transcendent justice "raised above might, time, and the State. rt Laws did 
not depend upon such metap~sical ideas but instead found their origin and 
2 
interpretation in the needs of time and place. His belief that the only 
universal law was that of conflict and change led naturally to the conclusion 
that there existed no absolute standard of public moralit,y or legality to which 
the state must conform. For him laws and rights were simply the creation of 
the state's power and he stated quite plainly that "Code, law, and justice are 
derived from Might and are created b.Y it.,,3 
In the last chapter it was stated that he believed there were individual 
rights other than those granted by the state. However, these rights were 
contingent upon the approval of the state, because, he said, if the state did 
not order society there would exist only "the naked struggle of individual 
entities and the eventual "domination of the stronger. 1I4 His idea was that 
there existed no such thing as law or justice unless there was the power to 
enforce them.5 He cited Niccolo Macchiavelli's !h! Prince, which he called 
lHans von Seeckt, !!!! Future .2! .:!!h! German $n!pire (London, 1930) p. 90. 
2Ibid., p. 911 ltV-That has become of the supersensuousness of Justice when 
lSH in~s country is administered on the principles of the Emperor Justinian, 
and a few hundred miles farther East the ISH of a Communist State obtains?" 
3Ibid., p. 90. 
4Ibid., p. 130. 
5Ibid., p. 90: "Within the country there is only State justice; outside 
of it 0i1iY Might. l 
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"entertaining and instructive even today," to the effect that good laws were 
6 
made possible by good soldiers. Seeckt outlined a consistent theory of power 
ba3ed on the thesis that power not only precedes law but that "right and law 
emanate from r1ight." 7 
He did not mean by this that power necessarily effected good laws nor that 
the State was free to make arry kind of law it desired. Since the state 
represented the nation, that is, the common interests of the people, he 
realized that there was an implicit restriction on the state to legislate onlY 
in the interest of the nation. "Law," he said, "only has this force 
[iegaliti/, as long as it is in being, that is to say, is in accord with the 
8 thought and life of the people •••• " How~ver, the important factor here was 
not the will of the people, which in any case was disunited, ill-informed .. and 
inarticulate, but the power of the state leadership to initiate measures 
belie'red to be in the common interest. The very existence of the state 
depended upon such authority and its enforcement. He considered it natural for 
the citizen to resist the state's authority and that civic compulsion was 
necessary.9 To put his thought more directly, the state theoretically derived 
6 129. Ibid. , p. 
-
7 131. Ibid., p. 
-
8 92. Ibid., p. 
-
9 92. Ibid., p. 
-
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its authorit.y from its people but practically this authority was directed upon 
the people for their common welfare. 
His nationalism identified the state with the people to the extent that in 
his mind the state came to stand for the people. In this connection he quoted 
the Latin proverb that the common good is the highest law and that it would be 
"a sham regard" for a legal principle to enforce a law that jeopardized the 
10 
good of the State (ideally the community). Apparently he did not conceive 
the national good and the security of the state as ever being in conflict. 
The right ot revolution was not one that he acknowledged. He believed in 
evolution and was extremely fearful of what abrupt changes might bring. The 
highest principle was the security of the state and obedience to whatever 
measures were tound necessar,y to maintain it. 
A sense of balance in the relationship between state power and individual 
freedom was lacking in Seeckt's thought. The authority of the state was 
absolute preoisely in order to ensure the treedan of the citizen. Some 
limitations, most notably economic, were laid down by Seeckt, but there is 
certainly little preCiseness about them and in general all conflicts between 
treedom and authority are resolved in the state's favor. Although he said that 
emergency regulations caused by a state of crisis should be removed as soon as 
possible, the reason for this was that such laws were the s,ymptom of 
11 governmental weakness and only disguised more fundamental weaknesses. 
lOrbid., p. 92. 
-
llIbid., p. 94. 
-
61 
It was precisely for this reason that Seeckt found the Weimar Republic 
lacking in its representation of the Reich. The parliamentar,r system obscured 
the full power of the state in relying too heavily on temporary expedients. 
Under the Weimar system laws were the result of compromise on the part of the 
various political parties and this was in no way a substitute for a "clear-cut 
State will, embodied in a personality.tt12 The state in its goal of embodying 
the common welfare had to be above party intrigues or else it would encourage 
endless resistance to its decrees. 
The State, enacting its laws and enforcing obedience to them by the 
instruments of its Might, is in the true sense of the words, social 
and democratic--for which reason neither the State nor the police 
are social-democrats. • •• The possibility of a party political 
attitude and the justifiable or unjustifiable fear of it, accounts 
in part for the dislike and resentment shown towards the State and 
its officers of public order, an indic.ation how necessary in a well-
ordered State is the effort to put the State above party. 13 
This was the ideal, because he believed the government leaders naturally came 
from the most powerful element in the nation, but the more they transcended th~~ 
own interests, the more power they would have, and consequently, the more they 
would be able to represent all interests, powerful or not. ImpliCitly, then, 
Seeckt believed in the necessity of popular acceptance of the regime. And he 
was so sure of the lack of public confidence in the Weimar regime that he 
counselled a moratorium on legislation so as not to further weaken the state 
idea in the minds of the people.14 For Seeckt, the chief crime of the Republic 
l2Ibid., p. 93. 
-
13Ibid., p. 131. 
-
14Ibid., p. 93. 
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~as that it did not use its power as a state, either for good or bad, and hence 
had no right to existence. 
Seeckt questioned whether a parliamentary system was able to govern 
German;r. His philosophy of government made clear that nothing short of 
constitutional changes were necessary if a complete breakdown in the Weimar 
Republic were to be avoided. To him the basic flaw in the Weimar system was 
the necessity of basing government on a cooperation of rival parties, exactly 
the point that most theorists see as the fundamental strength of democracy. 
In his view however, such a system could not work in Germaqy even from the 
standpoint of legislation since the full power of the state was not behind its 
laws. He acknowledged that the parliamentary system worked in England and in 
other countries but he maintained that it was wrong to attempt to institute it 
in GermanY since its development was entirely different. 
No matter what the government, the question of the implementation of 
policy by the police was vital. He was concerned about the numerous criticisms 
of the police ,because this struck at the very foundation of the state's 
authority.l' He believed one of the reasons for the general unpopularity of 
the police was that the Weimar government, in its weaknesses, was prOMUlgating 
16 
too many laws although he does not specifY which laws he found objectionable. 
A second reason was that of federal control of the ordinary police which he 
l'Ibid., p. 132. 
-
16Ibid• 
-
-63 
felt should rather originate and be controlled b,y the local authorities since 
17 they should be as close to the people as possible. On the other hand, 
certain departments, and he named only those dealing with major criminal 
investigations, should be as far as possible centralized, even !Ito a certain 
extent internationalized; not for any political object, only for its own 
18 
ends." Last of all, he fo1t it was a great mistake that every "verboten" 
sign in Germany should carry the imprint of the Reich's emblem. 19 
In connection with police affairs, Seeckt devotes some space to the 
relationship of the military and internal order. The armed forces are trained 
for the purpose of waging war aga:i. nst the external enemies of the state and 
their use as police would seriously compromise their standing with the people 
20 
and undermine for a long time the authority of the police. In the extraordi ... 
nary situation in which the police are helpless in maintaining the existence of 
the state, then the army must wage civil war which is "the most unhappy, and 
to a soldier, most distasteful" using full military means to obtain their 
21 
object. However, he asserted unequivocably that even with full knowledge of 
the many serious objections,t1 ••• the ar:my must, if the necessities of the 
State demand it, be prepared to take this ungrateful task upon its shoulders 
17 Ibid., p. 133. 
-
19Ibid., pp. 132-33. 
-
2Orbid., pp. 134-135. 
-
21Ibid., p. 135. 
-
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22 
and stand the consequences." However, he insisted that the state leadership 
be under no illusions that the army could ever allow itself "to be employed as 
23 party troops." 
This is the theoretical justification for the use of the Reichswehr in the 
1923 separatist uprisings in Saxony and Bavaria. Seeckt's stricture against 
the govern~entts use of the military to maintain the position of a particular 
party is also the partial explanation for Seecktts attitude in the Kapp Putsch 
of 1920. His adamant attitude about party politics also throws light on the 
24 
meaning of his reply to Ebert's question about whom the Reichswehr supnorted. 
The Reichswehr was a military organization which obe,yed the orders of its 
Commanding General who was subordinate to the President of the Reich through 
the Reichswehr Minister. The military chain of command was inflexible even for 
presidents. But as his action in 1920 showed the military commander was 
responsible for his interpretation of the direction he received fram his 
civilian superiors and if he found them objectionable his recourse was 
resignation and not insubordination. 
The armed forces existed however for a much broader purpose than internal 
security. They were an integral part of Seeckt's philosophy of force in the 
realm of foreign relations. He regarded foreign policy as operating from a 
position of power completely divorced from any notion of morality or legality. 
22Ibid., p. 134. 
23rbid. 
-
24 See Chapter Five for fuller treatment of this topic. 
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He defined the conduct of foreign affairs as being a combination of diplomacy 
and the militar,y.25 Because foreign relations were based upon power, the goal 
of Germany's foreign policy must be "the restoration of Germany as a Might 
26 
state." He believed that treaties and alliances, just as laws within the 
state, were meaningless without the power to implement them. "Alliances 
between States should be regarded entirely from the point of view of Might 
policy, and whatever else the treaties contain, their chief value, often their 
only value, lies in their milit~J clauses."27 Seecktts position was that a 
state relied not on the good will that was expressed in a pact but on its 
worth which could only be translated into military terms relative to political 
ends. 
These political aims naturally det~r.mine the staters foreign polia,y. 
Seeckt denied the proposition that domestic policy was more important than 
foreign relations since to him the,r were two different aspects of the state. 
Neither had primacy over the oth~r because both dealt with the political goal 
28 
of fostering state strength. Rooever, he maintained this to be true only in 
the case of a strong national state whose people and leaders were unaffected by 
outside interests and influences. 29 He believ(,d that a strong nationalism 
25Seeckt, Future .2! Empire, p. 107. 
26Ibid., p. 153. 
-
27Ibid., 
-
p. 151. 
28 Ibid. , 
-
p. 145. 
29Ibid., pp. 145-46. 
-
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inevit.ably resulted in strengthening the state's relations with foreign 
30 
countries and waR actually a factor in maintaining peace. 
The worst enemy of a strong foreign policy was mistaken internationalism. 
The idea of an economic union was repugnant to Seeckt's nationalism because 
the internal economic foundation of the state's independence would be 
influenced by the consideration of foreign economic needs. 3l State 
sovereignty demanded that each country serve their own economic interests and 
that this was the goal of foreign policy. International. economic ties 
destroyed the freedom of the militarily we~~ state since there would be "the 
oppression of the economically strong ~! the politically stronger, for in this 
32 
adventure, as in every other, Might rules. I' Seeckt :')elieved that Germany 
would suffer in such a situation because this type of association would have 
"the purpose and the object of conserving the status quo in Europe, and is 
therefore to the interests of those who believe this Eurooe and the world of 
33 tod~ to be politically the best available." Seeckt found the thought 
repugnant. 
There was a further danger to national strength in international finance 
which was more interested in profits than in national well-being. He commented 
3Orbid., p. 148. 
-
3l Ibid. , p. 150. 
-
32Ibid., p. 148. 
33Ibid., p. 149. 
-
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on this that, "It is impossible to shut one's eyes to the fact that the 
intertang1ed, international monetary powers and monetary interests are 
34 
beginning to acquire a super-State influence. 1f The belief that such invest-
ments would lead to the avoidance of war was mistaken in Seeckt's view because 
he realized that such economic arrangements could also very well be the cause 
35 
of war. Seeckt was not a mere xenophobe but he had no faith in any other 
safeguard to the security of a state but its power. He was not an isolationist 
but he appreciated that Germ~'a onlY chance of regaining her position as a 
great power was to avoid good wishes and concentrate steadfastly on the goal of 
force. 
In attaining this goal, Germany must be aware that in its weakened, post-
war condition any alliance it might make with a stronger country would be 
ultimately disadvantageous, because weak states in doing so place themselves in 
the position of being lithe stronger's vassal who can be dropped when 
36 
convenient." He did not believe that isolation or neutraliu.r was a practical 
solution to the international problems of a small state since such policies are 
only intelligible when founded on force and the will to use it. Germany's 
course had to be different because she was in reality a strong power who 
temporarily had been deprived of her power by the peaoe treat.r. 37 To regain 
34 r! 
.!2.!2:., p. 1;:;10. 
35Ibid• 
-
36Ibid., p. 152. 
-
37Ibid• 
-
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her position as a world leader, Germany would have to use diplomacy to get rid 
ot the military and economic restrictions by which the Allies had hoped to 
destroy her atter the war. 
He did not describe the course German toreign policy was to take in the 
restoration to the status ot a great power. The tact that he was one ot the 
originators and strongest advocate of the military and eoonomic allianoe with 
Russia, demonstrates how he translated his theories into action.38 The key to 
suoh an alliance is to be tound not simply in the tact that both Germany and 
Russia were outcasts and weak states in comparison to the Western Powers, but 
in his understanding of the nature of diplomacy. It was not based on legal 
permanence but on tluctuating basis ot national needs. A state must not teel 
bound to observe the provisions of a treaty whioh was no longer to its 
advantage and in moral justitication ot this position he wrote that "Treaties, 
alliances, pacts, associations, are, ot course, not made for all eternity, and 
the reservation 'rebus sic stantibus' in allot them is an understood secret 
1 "39 cause •••• 
Seeckt was not being cynical in this statement. It was a natural outgrowt 
ot his world view and his extreme nationalism in which laws and treaties were 
no more than a "scrap ot paper" in relation to the tar greater importance of 
national security. For Seeckt, there were no higher values than those of the 
38Hans U. Gatzke, Stresemann and the Rearmament of Germany (Baltimore, 
1954), pp. 87-88. -- - -
39 Seeckt" Future of E!DPir!l, p. 149. 
Reich. It would have been hypocritical of him to have disguised in flowery 
language his belief in the primacy of national self-interest. He understood 
the importance of world opinion but the first duty of each state was its own 
securit,y and interests. 
Soeckt was a believer in Machtpolitik from conviction and he found no 
possible alternative to it. In his most thoughtful work, Moltke, he 
considered at length the philosophical implications of his policy of force 
which he derived from Emmanuel Kant's discussion of the possibility of 
eternal peace. Seeckt's reading of Kant was that although eternal peace was an 
extremely remote possibility for mankind it should not be dismissed on that 
account because "if all human acts are subjected to the categorical imperative 
based on freedom, then this one cannot be subordinated in an indbridual 
40 instance to the principle of opportunism and cleverness.,t Even though Kant 
lauded peace as one of the ideals of mankind, he realized, Seeckt thought, that 
struggle 8.nd conflict was the natural condition of man.41 It was Seecktt s 
understanding of the human c ondi tion that served as his chief justification of 
following a course of power politics. 
According to Seeckt, Kant saw war as one of the competitive elements in 
the development of the natural world. Even ;llore, Seeckt saw' war as being 
something noble and dignified because Kant showed it was founded in human 
40Hare von Seeckt, Moltke, ..!!:!! -.V .... or;.,bi=l-..d (Berlin, 1931), p. 104. 
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nature. Seeckt was committed to the belief that war was both profoundly 
human and a good which effected the best in man. Hence, he saw pacifism as 
being an unnatural sentiment and unrealisticallY abstracted from the actual 
circumstances of life. Beyond the philosophical there is a religious 
justification for war as a positive good. Moltke's life showed, Seeckt wrote, 
that a militar,y career and piet" go together and that the soldier takes his 
vocation "not as a 'blind fighter for God, but in the full freedom of the 
Christian man. ,,43 Seeckt believed strongly that war was part of the moral 
order. 
Seeckt ended his discussion with Kant's view of the possibilit,r of man 
renouncing war by quoting him as saying that the whole question of eternal 
44 peace is about an ideal which probablY has no foundation in fact. He agreed 
with Kant that as a dream it was certainly a very appealing one. But it was 
for this very reason that Seeckt was unalterablY opposed to this ideal which he 
considered potentially capable of destrqying the state. The vision of peace, 
he believed, sapped the strength necessar,y to meet actual conditions confront-
ing the state.45 
In his Gedanken eines Soldaten, Seeckt again dismissed the theoretical 
42Ibid• , p. 105. 
-
43Ibid., p. 103. 
-
44 105. Ibid. , p. 
-
45Ibid., p. 109. 
-
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position of pacifism. He reduced all pacifist arguments to the question of the 
perfectability of man. Since this was something which could not be 
demonstrated one w~ or the other, he was not interested in the argument. He 
believed men had to operate not on the possibilit,y of same future development 
but in the light of present reality in which war was prominantly in the nature 
46 
of things. As in his discussion of political theor.1, Seeckt, the student of 
Machiavelli, here presented himself as the thoroughgoing realist operating 
within the liMits of actual present possibilities. 
Although Seeckt regarded pacifism as Germaqy's most insidious enemy, he 
was not unaware of the terrifying prospects of modern warfare. He knew well 
vThat the four years of fighting had cost Germany and in partioular that all 
future wars would be total. It is understandable then, that Seeckt oalled the 
soldier, the man whose profeSSion was war, the only true pacifist.47 He at no 
time gave a~ indication that he conceived of the militar,y in romantic or 
adventurous terms. His attitude reflected a belief in his vocation as a career 
of service and self-sacrifice with few compensations. The reason for the 
armed forces was their employment in war, but to deoide upon this c~ursewas of 
the gravest consequence. 
Paoifism, he believed, did not arise from the terror of modern weapons 
46Hans von Seeckt, Gedanken eines Soldaten (Berlin, 1929), p. 73. 
47 5 
.!!?!s!., p. 7 • 
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48 beoause every past war had been horrible "even to the civilian." HOTNever, 
the state in its mission of promoting the well-being of the Reich, cannot 
allow itself to be moved by such considerations of modern weaponry and their 
disasterous effects upon civilization. As much as Seeckt understood the 
consequences of modern war, he demanded that war, as a fact of life, must 
always be reckoned with in state councils. He lamented the unrealistic 
atmosphere created by pacifism in his own time which branded as Itwar-mongerers ff 
people who stated the simple fact, as Moltke had done, that war was an un-
49 
avoidable evil out of which some good would always come. 
Since war was a natural part of existence and played such a large part in 
the history of the great pONers, Seeckt had no doubt that Germal1Y' lTlUst be 
prepared to fight another war at some future date or cease to exist. However, 
he did not believe in war for war's sake. Instead, as a soldier and a "true 
pacifist,1I he realized how often politicians resorted to "Tar as a substitute 
for realistic aims. Seeckt corrected Clausewitz's statement which called war 
the continuation of a political policy to read the "bankruptcy of that 
50 policy." He declared it was the positive moral obligation of statesmen to 
strive for the reduction of the danger of war in the settling of disputes. At 
the least this should achieve, he hoped, limiting war to '" the great anti theses 
48 Ibid., p. 74. 
-
49Seeckt, Moltke, p. 107. 
50seeokt, Gedanken, p. 74. 
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of life. t ,,51 The attainable goal that he saw within the reach of mankind was t 
52 
rid the world of wars over purely political affairs. Here as perhaps nowhere 
else in his writings does Seeckt more strongly put the onus on the state's 
leaders for the use of the philosophy of force. He believed the responsibility 
for waging war did not rest upon the conscience of the militar,y but upon their 
political superiors. 
The limitation of war was possible but not its complete elimination. In 
his eyes if the politiciana of the world really desired to mitigate the evils 
of war, one practical possibility existed in the reduction of armaments.53 
There were two types of wars and both could be sharply reduced in number and 
magnitude. The f1rst were those between political governments and these could 
54 be avoided at the conference table. The second were those between peoples 
caused by some spiritual conflict into which, for example, the First World 
War had degenerated, could be avoided by reducing armaments which would lessen 
the likelihood of their occurrence.55 His fundamental objection to such plans 
was the necessary disproportion of militar,r strength between countries. This 
could be overcome by the creation of a balance of armaments so that no one 
state had superior forces in relation to a combination of other states. 56 
Another practical. advantage of such a system, he believed, was the fact that it 
51Ibid. 
-
52Ibid., p. 76. 
53Ibid., p. 74. 
-
54Ibid., p. 75. 
-
55Ibid., pp. 75-76. 
-56Ibid• 
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would produce a feeling of secur1t.y, a prerequisite for times of neace and one 
which did not exist in the Europe of his time. 
Armament reduction did not mean to Seeckt the end of universal military 
conscription. He held that the ultimate basis for the defense of one's 
countr,y in modern times was the principle of such militar,r training. The 
apparent contradiction in the reduction of armaments while retaining universal 
militar,r training is explainable because Seeckt conceived of small, professiona 
standing armies in all countries, with the population of the countr,y and all of 
its material resources available and re~ for use in the event that a war 
developed which could not be ended in a short time. However, he doubted the 
possibility of limited warfare in the post-Napoleonic world.,7 
Seeckt believed that the Treaty of Versailles only made another war more 
likely. "Peace treaties have replaced a Europe in which there were a few big 
differences which statecraft has for decades contrived to bridge, by a new 
Europe, in which ~lere is a succession of unsolved problems, which it will be 
difficult, if not impossible, to solve by' pacific means.lt,a Even though he 
regretted this, Seeckt believed that there was little alternative other than 
war in a world of unbalanced forces. In arw event, he realized that Germany 
would have to work for changes in the European power relationships. Such a 
stabilization had to be accomplished before there could be aqy hope for better 
,7 
Seeckt, Landesverteidigung, p. 30. 
,SSeeckt, Future .2! J:he §metre, p. 157. 
59 times. 
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In the Europe created at Versailles, Germany was faced with two alterna-
tives. Seeckt saw that a decision had to be made between becoming either a 
satellite of France or of Russia. Either choice meant the destruction of 
Germany because it would become the battleground in the future war between East 
60 
and \1'est which he felt must eventually come. He dismissed England as having 
only a small role to play in the impending conflict because the innovations of 
61 
the submarine and the airplane ended her as a great power. He saw France as 
Germ&r\Y's natural eneIllY' and any rapprochement with her would in etfect mean the 
62 
end of German sovereignty. lherefore, he concluded, Germany's only wt13' out 
of its dilemma was close economic and military cooperation with RUSSia based 
63 
upon a realistic foreign policy. If as a result Germa~ became a strong 
national power again, Seeckt believed there would be nothing to fear from 
64 Russian Communism. 
Seeckt insisted that the German people be aware that the;r would in all 
probability have to fight another war to solve their problems. He thought that 
the "war guilt" clause of the treaty had morally confused many Germans. He 
59Ibid., pp. 158-159. 
-
60Hans von Seeckt, Deutschland zwischen ~ ~ ~ (Hamburg, 1933), p. 8. 
61Ibid., pp. 16-18. 
-
62Ibid., p. 28. 
-
63Ibid., p. 34. 
-
64Ibid., pp. 40..43. 
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castigated the hypocrisy of the Allies in persistinF to blame Germany for the 
65 1914 war, even though historical documents had been published to the contrary. 
He did not dispute, however, that because Germany lost the war it had to pay 
the consequences of being weak. But Seeckt emphasized that ~Jch an acceptance 
66 had nothing to do with moral guilt. Seeckt's thought placed the interests of 
the nation above all other values, and in modern total war this was especially 
true because its very s1~vival was at stake. His message to his people might 
be put as s~ing that, no matter what country had the responsibilit,y for 
startin? the next war, Germans must have the moral fibre to do whatever is 
necessar,y to win. Seeckt based Germany's future on whether it understood 
correctly the ethics of force. 
65::;eeckt, Future 2! Empire, p. 157. 
66 ~.J pp. 159-160. 
CHAPTER IV 
THE REICHSWEHR 
More than any other individual Seeckt was responsible for the preservation 
of the defeated German ~ as an efficient fighting force in spite of the 
destructive limitations imposed upon it after the war. In his capacity as 
Chief of the Arm1 Command, he was determined to actively plan and control the 
development of the Reichswehr, leaving nothing to chance because of the Allied 
1 
conditions. He considered his main tasks in accomplishing this to be the 
neutralization of the treaty's various harmful restrictions and the preparation 
2 
of a cadre a~ for expansion when the opportunity presented itself~ From a 
purely militar,r standpoint his work was successful in that the Reichswehr was 
able to make the future transition into Hitler's Wehrmacht and its total 
rearmament in 1935 without changing his basic policies. In a wider sense, 
however, his work was meaningless because the German army thereafter allowed 
itself to become the instrument of a ruthless opportunist who brought 
destruction not only to it but to the Whole of the Geman nation. The next 
chapter will examine how Seeckt failed to solve the political problems facing 
the military of the nascent Republic which proved so fateful for German 
IHans von Seeckt, Die Reichswehr (Leipzig, 1933), p. 7. 
_';';';;'';;';';;';;;';;';;.;..;;.;0 ... 
2 Ibid., p. 30. 
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democracy. The present chapter will confine itself to an examination of 
Seeckt's significant military ideas such as the plan of the Reichswehr's 
development, the necessity of universal conscription, the principle of leader-
ship, the lessons learned from the First Hor1d 1tlar, and the anticipated form 
of future wars. 
To understand the character of Seeckt's Reichswehr it is necessary to 
begin with the confusion and uncertainty of the sixteen months preceding his 
assumption of command. In his book, published in 1933, dealing with the 
creation and policies of Germany's new ~, ~ _R.ei.c.h.BW.-e.hr_, Seeckt described 
the situation faCing the provisional government upon the termination of 
hostilities as a dual crisis of internal disorder and external pressure on 
Germany's borders.3 Under such conditions there was a pressing need for a 
mili tary organization immediately adequate to the task of insuring the new 
government's stability. However, in Seeckt's view, the primary consideration 
which guided the military was not the maintenance of a particular regime but 
the preservation of the nation's unity.4 In the desperate post-war situation 
Seeckt credited the Freikorps with having saved Germa~ trom dissolution.5 He 
did not allude to any direct connection of these groups with either the 
government or its military. However, it is known that when the Imperial Arrrr:r 
3 13. Ibid., p. 
-
4Ibid., p. 14. 
-
5n l!.d. 
19 
ceased to exist with the desertion of General Lequis' group in Berlin on 
Christmas Eve 1918, the General. Staff with the knowledge of the government 
decided upon raising volunteer bodies which would obey their orders.6 
This was the genesis of the Friekorps which were used ~ Gustav Noske, the 
newly appointed Defense Minister, to bring about a relative pacification of the 
country. These organizations were given some legality when the National 
Assembly, for whom Seeckt prepared a memorandum, passed the law of March 1919, 
which created the four hundred thousand man Provisional Reichswehr. The best o~ 
the Freikorps were then absorbed into this Reichswehr as brigades. The March 
Reichswehr was short-lived, however, because in June Germaqr accepted the 
entirely different conditions imposed ~ the peace treaty. In July the 
government constituted the Preparatory Commission for the Peace Army with 
8 Seeckt as President with the task of planning for the necessary changes. At 
this critical time Seeckt suffered a heart attack and the actual work of 
setting up the new Reichswehr was carried out b,y others.9 He returned to duty 
in October 1919 as head of the Truppenamt from which he would be promoted in 
6Walter Gor1itz, Der Deutsche Generalst&b. Geschichte und Gestalt 1651-!2!!2 (Frankfurt am Main, 1950), p. 300. --
1Ibid., p. 305. 
8Jacques Benoist-Mechin, Histo~ of the German~ Since the Armistice, 
trans. Eileen R. T~lor (Zurich, 19 9):-p:-)45. ---
9G~r1itz, Genralstab, p. 311. 
80 
Harch 1920 as Chief of the High Command. 
In this position he was responsible for the i.mplementation of the military 
clauses of the fifth part of the Versailles Treaty by which the reconstitution 
of the German army was bound. The army was to be reduced to a hundred 
thousand men of whom four thousand were to be officers. The length of service 
for officers was to be twenty-five years and the enlistment of troops was to 
be for twelve years. The new army was divided into two arll\V cOIlL'nands which 
together composed seven infantry and three cavalry divisions. Certain weapons 
were denied to it such as aircraft, heavy artillery, tanks, and armored cars, 
and all other weapons were limited to specific quantities. The Great General 
Staff was abolished and plans for war or provisions for German mobilization 
were forbidden. Conscription or any form of military training was prohibited. 
All fortifications were subject to Allied approval and periodic inspection. 
The Allied Military Commission was made sole interpreter of these provisions 
and the manner of their fulfillment. In effect, Germany's power to undertake 
another war was abolished. The question for Seeckt was whether such an army 
10 
could be made capable of defending Germa.t:tV from attack. 
Fourteen years after its inception, Seeckt described the Reichswehr as 
certainly not the ideal army for Germany but one that was acceptable for the 
present and necessary for the future.ll While many of his fellow officers had 
declined to take any part in the creation of the post-war restricted army, 
10Seeckt, Reichswehr, p. 29. 
11 Ibid., p. 33. 
-
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Seeckt had championed it on the grounds that even its imperfect existence was 
the first requirement for German security since its weaknesses could be 
remedied later. The immediate task was to create as effective an instrument of 
state as possible within treaty limitations in such a way that it was ready for 
12 
expansion and development whenever that was possible. To accomplish this he 
fel tit was necessary to draw upon the spirt t of the imperial army as the 
source for the Reiohswehr. He defined his basic aim as the reconstruction of 
13 the previous German arnr;y in a new form. 
From the first, Seeokt was convinoed that the militar,r clauses of the 
treaty were intended to destroy the German army b.y attacking its traditions 
and spirt t. This assault on the spiritual foundations of the arJTtY by physical 
restriction was embodied in four points: the novel introduction of a German 
mercenar,y army, the dissolution of the Great General Staff, the denial of 
modern weapons, and the forbidding of universal militar,r training.14 The 
reduotion in numbers and the large percentage of cavalry to the rest of the 
Reichswehr did not worr,y Seeokt as much as these four provisions. The material 
defeots in the new German Army could be repaired relatively easily at a later 
time, but the loss of its spiritual quality might never be replaced. Conse-
quently, it was preCisely this spiritual element in the militar,r that he was 
12Ibid• 
l3Ibid., p. 13. 
-
14Ibid., pp. 2l-27. 
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determined the Allies would never crush. This idea was the primary source for 
Seeckt's organization of the Reichswehr.15 
By the spirit of the old German Army, Seeckt meant the interior motivating 
force ~1ich gives &n1 body its distinctive personality, which in the case of 
the German ~ was both its highly efficient organization and its instantaneou 
16 
capabilities of mobilizing its offensive power. The victors aware the,r could 
not destroy the German military spirit, consequently attempted to make this 
spirit incapable of actio:1. He was certain that the Reichswehr had successfu~ 
neutralized the harmful purpose of the four key provisions. 
Another aspect of the militar,r spirit was its tradition. The uniquely 
German military experience was founded in its intimate union with the nation 
17 
and its history of service to the Reich. Seeckt believed that the new ~ 
must in some way continue the traditions of the old. A1 though Seeckt was bound 
to construct an ~ within certain narrow limits, there was much he could do 
in the matter of continuing German militar,r tradition. An example of his 
preservation of continuity was the question of the Reichswehr uniform. He 
pointed out how important the uniform was in making the soldier proud of 
belonging to a special community and also its role in being the symbol with 
18 
which the German people will be able to identifY themselves. For both 
15Ibid., p. 7. 
-
16rbid., -p. 9. 
l7Ibid., p. 8. 
-
18Ibid., p. 49. 
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reasons the field-gray greatcoat of l..vorld Har I was retained. The uniform 
served, he concluded as the badge of the inner community not only of the 
Reichswehr but of all Germans.l9 
Seeckt emphasized the identification of the nation with the army as one of 
the guiding factors in the formation of the Reichswehr. The preservation of 
tradition was the chief means of insuring that when the treaty restrictions 
were lifted the army would once again assume its respected role in German 
20 affairs~ In an apparent reference to illegal nationalistic and paramilitary 
organizations, he stressed that by the preservation of tradition people would 
understand more easily that the Reichswehr was the proper agency for national 
21 defense. There could be no separation of the Reichswehr from the German 
people. 
Seeckt's regard for tradition was partly inspired by what he called "the 
psychology of the milit.ary." By this he referred to the fact that both the 
soldier and the civilian were cons~ious of the great military heroes and 
victories of the past. People must be able to identify the post-war army with 
this tradition of greatness. The means by which this was to be fostered was by 
22 
the preservation of past military customs. 
This was not to become a blind acceptance of the past, however. It was a 
19Ibid., p. 53. 
-
20Ibid., p. 57. 
-
21Ibid• , p. 58. 
-
22Ibid., p. 47. 
-
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carefUl selection of traditions that were valuable militarily and evocative of 
patriotism to the public. However much Seeckt emphasized this need for 
continuity in the military, he was well aware also of history's dynamic force 
and the value of change. He had been a member of the Great General Staff which 
had taught him the fundamentals of war but which had prized nexibility in 
23 
relation to them. His definition of the Reichswehr as the old army in a new 
form indicated how his conservatism was balanced by progressive tendencies. 
He believed that every organization had the tendency to become stagnant 
and alien to the spirit of its time. This is especially true of armies, he 
wrote, whioh are by nature conservative since everything that they have learned 
has been taught at great oost and it is impossible for them to forget suoh 
things easily. He concluded from. this that since military men view any 
proposal of refrom as revolutiOnary, it takes a oatastrophe, such as the defeat 
of 1918, for them to recognize and correct weaknesses that naturally corne to 
exist wi th the passage of time. 24 
The Reichswehr, he hoped, had taken advantage of the lessons taught by" the 
war but their full implenlentation would have to wait until the lifting of the 
treaty restrictions. At the very beginning of his book on the Reichswehr he 
stated his belief in an Hegelian-like "organic law of being" by which all 
historical events beoome simultaneously oreative as well as destructive.25 
23Hans von Seeckt, Moltke, !!a Vorbild (Berlin, 1931), pp. 81-84. 
24Seeckt, Reichswehr, pp. 32-33. 
25 Ibid., p. 7. 
-
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Seeckt's philosophical evolutionism therefore could not regard eradication 
as static and unchanging. He believed the spirit was dynamically developable, 
26 
renewing itself and changing imperceptibly each day. For exa,'nple, attempts 
to integrate some of the monarchical traditions of the imperial army into the 
Reichswehr proved failures. 27 In an apparent reference to the Allied Control 
Commission he CM ticized those who suspected a. "plot" to restore the old army 
. 28 because the Reichswehr was obviously and necessarily quite different.· It was 
an original spiritual connnunity formed from the union of old and new. He 
concluded that the spirit of the Reichswehr was continuing to develop and would 
29 
continue to do so. 
By preserving the old, Seeckt meant keeping the army distinctively German 
drawing upon past experience for espirit.2! corps, patriotiC national support, 
and efficient military organization. Those who find that this preservation of 
tradition had sinister results for Germany have generally over-stated their 
case by implying reactionary mj~itarism as the core of that tradition. Telford 
Taylor, for example, has written that, "The successful transmigration of soul 
from the imperial ~ ~ to the Reichswehr caused a fatal fiaw in the 
30 
foundations of the Republic, and was a most fateful event in world history." 
26Ibid., 
-
p. 63. 
27Ibid., p. 60. 
28Ibid., p. 61. 
-
29Ibid• , p. 64. 
30Telford Taylor t Sword and Swastika: Reich (New York, 1952), p. 2u-.--
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Leaving the political question for the next chapter, it would seem that what he 
really meant to say ":ias that by retaining its pride and structure the new 
German army developed into the strongest in Europe. It was the beliet in the 
philosophy of force, which was not limited to one country, that was dangerous 
in the rearming of Germany and not the fact that the Reichswehr found strength 
in its past traditions. 
A more carefully thought out position is that the treaty restrictions were 
responsible for the reactionary tendencies in the Reichswehr. For instance, 
Stern in his stu~ of various military systems wrote that it was the treaty 
which !tactually imposed upon Germazv a military system which practically 
guaranteed the continued dominance of the old-time officer even in the army of 
the new republic. ItJl Although this was to some extent not wholly the fault of 
the treaty since no army may be organized without the leadership of experienced 
soldiers, such criticism is well-founded. Seeckt lamented the difficulty of 
attracting and promoting younger officers in such a restricted organization.J2 
Seeckt's main aim then was to fashion something that was viable and not 
venerable and it was precisely because he succeeded that the Reichswehr became 
an agressive instrument in the service of Hitler. The real danger to peace was 
31Frederick Martin Stern, ~ Citizen.!!!!!1L (New York, 1956), p. 94. 
32Seeckt, Reichswehr, p. 65. 
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not found in a corrupt military "soul" but in the political direction. 
Seeckt labored at preserving, developing, and broadening a distinctively 
German military spirit for the young Reichswehr conscious that this was one of 
the prerequisites for a strong~. The Allies had determined the framework iJ 
which this work was to be carried on. But Seeekt never pretended that he was 
satisfied with the general terms of the treaty and the type of army it afforded 
his country. Nor did he hide the fact that his ultimate goal was a modern army 
on the same footing with those of other large nations. He believed it to be thE 
duty of the government and the Reichswehr Ministry to strive for the treaty's 
revision and he felt it unjust and unrealistic for the Allies to try to maintait 
them. His main argument was that these provisions of reducing Germany's arntV 
was tied to the presumption of a general. European disarmament which had proved 
unfounded and that the Allies would in the near future have to relent. 33 His 
skirting of some of the restrictions was so limited in scope as to be negligiblE 
in retrospect. It seems to be a fair judgment that the treaty's military 
points were effectively maintained. 
The German army ceased to exist as a major fighting force, and no one 
had to worry about actual war with Germany for many years to come. 
The occasional evasions were made much of at a later date; and people 
then talked as though the disarmament clauses of the treaty had 
either never been observed or were of no value. In fact they 
achieved their purpose so long as they remained in force.34 
33 Ibid., p. 17. 
-
34A• J. p. Taylor, ~ Origins of ~ Second World ~ (New York, 1939) 
p. 42. 
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Seeokt attempted by relatively unsuccessful subterfuge to offset the four 
points of the treaty which he felt were manifestly intolerable if Germany were 
to provide for her seCurity. He did so in the belief that a country had the 
moral duty "in spite of and together with treaties" to protect herself and that 
the Allies, in such documents as the Kellogg Pact, had recognized such a right 
35 to self-defense. The first of these restrictions against which he schemed 
was that Germany was saddled with a mercenary army in which the nation was 
barred from participation. At the beginning of 1923, under the pressure of the 
French occupation of the Ruhr, he began an experiment with a clandestine 
mili tia. The number of men involved in the "Black Reichswehr" affair was 
approximately fifty thousand and they were disbanded at the end of the year 
because discipline and military effectiveness were impossible under the 
circumstances. 
The second limitation was the outlawing of universal military training. 
After the difficulties with the Arbeitertruppe auxiliaries nothing further was 
done to expand the army illega~. However, Seeckt continued to emphasize the 
importance of national military training and maintained that the defense of 
36 GeI'ma.IW was hopeless without it. For the time being he was content to foster 
sports and organizations that taught skills, such as rifle or aviation clubs, 
anything that was aimed at keeping the youth of the nation physically fit. 
35Hans von Seeckt, .!h! Future 2f. .!:.!:!!! German Empire (London, 1930), p. 136. 
36Hans von Seeckt, Landesverteidiguns (Berlin, 1930), p. 10. 
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The third restriction was the liquidation of the Great General Staff. The 
idea of the Allies had been to destrqy the efficiency of the General Staff qy 
decentralizing its tasks, but it was obvious that some organization so vital to 
the modern a~, would have to assume its functions. The continuation of the 
major part of the Staff's activities by the Allied approved Truppenamt was 
quietly done but on such a small scale for the tiny army that when Hitler began 
his expansion for the Wehrmacht there were not nearly enough men who could 
qualify to undertake staff Positions.31 Seeckt pointed out that although the 
Reichswehr Ministry carried out many of the functions of the old staff, such as 
the study of foreign relations, he still believed that the Reichswehr could not 
be a modern army without the reconstitution of the Great General Staff.38 He 
explained that its eradication and the education that it provided officers in 
facing grave and comolex situations was a serious handicap to the Reichswehr'a 
successfully fighting a future war.39 
The last provision that disturbed Seeckt '>'Tas that of certain modern 
armaments. Th0re '!,vas a limited policy of experimentation in forbidden weapons 
abroad, especially in RUSSia, 'Jut it was certainly on a minor scale. Hore 
important was the careful cultivation of relations wPh various industries 
which were secretly coordinated to an eventual rearmament. Seeckt was 
37Walter Goerlitz, ~isto:s of the German General Staff l657-l94~ trans. 
Brian Battershaw (New York, 19:J3),p. 227. 
38Seeckt, Reichswehr, n. 77. 
39 4 
..!E!:!." p. 7 • 
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extremely concerned that German industry have the built-in capacity for under-
taking rearmament when the restrictions were dropped.40 However, the treaty 
was successful in keeping modern weapons from being used by the vast majority 
of the Raichswehr and as the eventual rearmament under Hitler showed. 
Except for complaints and the occasional attempt to circumvent the 
treaty, Seeckt was bound to rebuild the German army as the Allied Military 
Commission indicated. Seeckt tied the success of his work within these 
limitations to the creation of a military form that was capable of organic 
expansion when possible. He had to prevent a fatal passivity and stagnation 
from arising in the externally weak army by conversely concentrating on its 
internal worth.4l The Reichswehr would serve the immediate needs of state 
security as well as its weakened condition allowed, but even more important it 
would be ready at the proper time to undergo a "transformation, extension, 
enlargement, and supplementation.,,42 This, in effect, was the gigantic 
conspiracy that General Fuller thought no one but himself wanted to see. It 
was the aim of the German military to rebuild an effective power instrument 
for Germany even to the point of secretly violating the treaty on the four 
points Seeckt found unbearable. If these points had been conceded to the 
Republic instead of to Hitler, it is conceivable that the German military 
might not have been so susceptable to the Nazi propaganda and patronage. 
4<>n,id. , p. 20. 
4l~., p. 31. 
42Ibid. 
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Except for these ineffectual violations Seeckt remained committed to the 
idea of fulfillment of the treaty provisions. Because of its material 
limi tations, Seeckt realized that the Reichswehr could not compete \-1ith other 
armies in quantit,r, but that its hope l~ in painstaking concentration on 
achieving some kind of qualitative superiority. The Reichswehr had to find 
some substitute for material strength. This necessity gave rise to the concept 
.. 
of the army of leaders (Fuhrerarmee) that is, the reliance upon an exhaustive 
and never-ending training of each individual which was to be the basis for an 
elite a.rm;y. At the end of his book detailing the construction of the Reichswehl, 
Seeckt concluded that even though it was badly outnumbered and poorly equipped, 
.. 
this Fuhrerarmee had been able to salvage the essential quality of the old 
army, a well-ordered professional leadership which was "able to gradually 
develop itseIf out of the chaos of the post-war period.,,43 
This was an extraordinary achievement in view of the required reduction of 
the officer corps from forty thousand to four thousand men. The end in view fo 
Seeckt was not a recreation of the old officer corps whose members had proved 
their :.;orth in the war, but to concentrate on the introduction of younger :nen, 
thereby displacing experience for the required natural develonment of the new 
a.rm;y.44 The new officer corps was to be siMilar to the old in essence, train-
ing, and outlook, but it would consist of a new generation who would be the 
43Ibid., n. 135. 
44Ibid., p. 65. 
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natural representative of the old corps.45 The selection of these relatively 
few men was based on many considerations primarily of a technical and 
professional character.46 But Seeckt wanted it understood that the Arrrr:r 
CO'Tl.mand alone had determined in every case "rho its officers were to be so that 
neither t.he government nor the 'larious political groups had been able to 
infiltrate their ranks. 47 He affirmed that the corps must have a broader 
48 
national composition than the previous ~. The single qualification for 
consideration of an individual was his ability. Seeckt admitted that some 
political pressure had been exerted for the admission of enlisted men into 
the corps, but that most of them had simply not been able to meet the 
necessary educational and technical standards required, and therefore, he 
concluded, a practical consideration solved a potentially significant 
political question. 49 
The greatest handicap in the treaty was in the education of the officer. 
Hi1itary academies were not p8rmitted so that the process of training was 
changed to provide for learning leadership among the troops rather than 
50 
military theory. He saw this necessity of training his young officers while 
actively engaged in command positions as another "spiritual bridge" to the past 
45Ibid. , pp. 68-69. 
46Ibid. , pp. 65-71. 
47Ibid. , p. 70. 
48Ibid• , p. 66 and R9. 
49Ibid. , pp. 70-71. 
50Ibid., p. 73. 
93 
when the Prussian army in Napoleonic ti.rnes was also severly' limited as to 
number and training.5l However, he expressed a certain doubt as to the quality 
of decisions officers trained in this way might make in a future war. 52 
The military clauses of the treaty also set the enlistment of the troops 
at twelve years and even provided for the yearly' percentage of discharges. As 
a result, Seeckt pointed out, the smallest number of men possible would 
receive military training and the building of aQ1 kind of reserve was 
impossible. The short length of service made it impossible to make a career 
out of the arm1 but long enough to discourage aQ10ne of ability. To overcome 
this handicap, Seeckt decided to emphasize both the appeal of belonging to an 
elite group and the value of good comradeshiP.53 
His ideas on military training were particularly well thought out and he 
treated them at length in his chapter on the troops. He divided training into 
three areas: education, drill, and disCipline. The f,oal of education was to 
create the independent, self-reliant person. Drill was the means to obtain an 
automatic reaction to routine tasks so as to leave the mind free for more 
in~ortant matters. And lastly discipline was the strengthening of the will to 
carry out aims.54 The relationship of these three, he wrote, is that, "drill 
helps during a moment of the will's weakness, until education regains control 
51Ibid., p. 74. 
52Ibid. 
53Ibid., p. 94. 
54Ibid., Pp. 100-102. 
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of discipline. u55 This stands in sharp contrast to the popular notion ot 
German military training, the so-called Kadgvergehorsam (corpse-like obedience) 
Since Seeckt's avowed purpose was raising the quality of his small army to 
offset its material weakness, his emphasis on the individual soldier's 
intelligence was sincere. In the eight pages he devoted to the training of the 
soldier, five concern education of the individual's capabilities. The basis of 
education he believed was the awakening of the person to the ideals of the 
spirit and his own dignity and capabilities. Formal education was necessarYi 
Seeckt believed to fill in gaps in the soldier's background and would have 
56 direct benefit for the quality of the Reichswehr. 
The twelve year enlistment meant that training would not have any limited 
goal but would be diversified in all aspects of militar,y skills so that the 
result would be an ar~ of elite troops.57 Further there was developed the 
concept of double training: to be trained and then to train others.58 The men 
who were discharged atter twelve years of this intensive formation would be 
able to train recruits, lead a future national army or militia, or serve as 
59 front line reserve soldiers. The Fuhrerarmee principle extended then to the 
rank and file and beyond to encompass the entire nation. This diversified 
55Ibid., p. 101. 
56Ibid., pp. 106-107. 
57~., p. 96. 
58Ibid• , p. 99. 
59Ibid., p. 100. 
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training progra~ gave each man extraordinar,y flexibility, and, in Seeckt's 
opinion, gave the Reichswehr the required quality to c'JIIlpensate for its small 
numbers.60 Seeckt believed in the universal soldier, a man tra.ined in all 
branches of the arrt\V but specializing in one. Al though the development of 
modern weapons had made them L~possibly complicated, he saw the advantage of an 
~ of such universal soldiers, which, qy knowing at first hand the efficacy 
of all these various weapons, would be able to cooperate in the most effective 
61 
manner. 
Actual training ,vas hampered by the various prohibitions of the treaty and 
Seeckt did not believe that the Reichswehr could profit very much from 
theoretical studies of forbidden weapons. The study of abstract theory could 
not provide forbidden weapons nor the lrnowledge to use th~;m in the event of an 
62 . 
attack. And worst of all he cited the destruction of the armament industry 
which would take such a lonq, time to retool and catch up to modern develop-
63 
ments. He ridiculed the necessit,y of trying to train men with make-believe 
substitutes for real weapons. No soldier, he said, would be prepared for a 
tank rolling over the border if he was only used to nl~ying with pasteboard 
64 
replicas. And there were many features of modern warfare for wh:i.ch no 
6OJ:bid. , n. 109. 
61Ibid. , p. 110. 
62Ibid• , P. 120. 
-
63Ibid. , n. 119. 
64Ibid• , p. 112. 
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subst.itutes could be used and ... hich cr;uld not be studted even theoretically, 
such as the airplane.65 
There v.ler(! areas undisturbed by the treaty. The engineers although 
forbidden certain fixed fortifications could be trained for the erection of 
66 
mobile defense positions. In actual fact, perhaps because of the tceaty, 
they became expert in the development of demolition techniques. The Signal 
Corps l'Tas completely free to adapt and im'!1rove the technical science of 
67 
oommunj.cations which v.las. ,,0 vi tal to successful operations. The infantry 
al though l-Teakened in numbers and 'veapons was still the basic force of the 
Reichswehr and its value Has unimpaired by the treaty because the Reichswehr 
had been so caref'll to cultivate the individual soldier's education and 
68 
spirit. 
He was not at all distrubed by the large proportion of cavalry units 
imposed by the treaty. It ~ .. as obviously the intention of the allies to thereby 
weaken the Reichswehr by dissipating its numbers with a military branch that 
had been proved unsuitable for modern warfare.69 Seeckt ,justified his 
acceptance of the imposition of cavalry by maintaining that the Reichswehr 
70 
would offset the enemy's offensive fire pOHer ",i th a defensive mobility. 
65Ibid., pp. 112-113. 
66Ibid., p. 121. 
67Ibid., pp. 121-122. 
68Ibid., Dp. 113-115. 
69Alfred Vagts, ! History 2.! >1ilitarism (New York, 1959), p. 230. 
70Seeckt, Reichswehr, p. 114. 
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He believed that ,just as technological innovations such as the machine gun had 
replaced the cavalry, in the sameY-lay, the motor would restore mobility. 71 
However, the Reichswehr tvould continue to employ the horse because its use in 
rough terrain could never be displaced by the motor. The cavalry, with horse 
and motorized units, are necessary for decisive movements of men and arms and 
was valued by him as the most balanced branch of the small mobile ~.72 
He argued that mounted troops remain necessary because of their abilit,r to 
gather and disperse quickly, their value for reconnaissance purposes, their 
usefulness in the fluid opening days of a war, especially for the defender, and 
the educational value for the men trained in such units. 73 
In writing of the value of motorized units in the transportation corps he 
mentioned that the improvements of science would eventually bring about the 
74 
complete motorization of the entire army of the future. However, he warned 
that theorizing about it, before science made it actually possible, was 
dangerous to its being correctly employed when the time came. 75 Instead, he 
believed that the Reichswehr should p~ close attention to the militar,y 
76 
experiments conducted along these lines by foreign armies. Although his 
71Ibid., p. 115. 
72Ibid., pp. 116-118. 
- . 
73Seeckt, Moltke, p. 156. 
74Seeckt, Reichswehr, p. 124. 
75Ibid., pp. 124-125. 
-
76Ibid., D. 126. 
-
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sympathies ,-lere for the horse, he was well aware and responsive to the military 
uses of technology. lie obviously did nat forsee that technical improveMents 
would come so rapidly. The ~pe of leadership he gave to the Reichswehr is 
shown by the fact that he al101fred those young officers such as Guderian to 
interest themselves in the study of motorized tactics. 77 
Seeckt's second aim that he had set himself was to construct an army that 
could be enlarged and modernized instantly either when the treaty restrictions 
were ended or as the result of an invasion. Some of the featt!res of this army 
of the future have already been pointed out. Hhat remains to be analysed are 
the military prinCiples that governed his th~nking about future war. These 
theories arose fram his evaluation of the reasons for GermanY's defeat in the 
world vTar and he published them in a 1930 pamphlet, Landesverteidigun,g. His 
basic concluSion was that the side with the most men and materials in anY long 
78 
conflict must ultimately be the victor. This was to be the fundamental 
consideration for any military planning for German security. 
Seeckt had often pointed out the Reich's obvious lack of resources, 
population, an d military allies. Consequently, the first aim of German defense 
in any future war must be to reach the fastest possible decision against the 
79 
enemy. Such had also been the plan in the l'lorld \...rar but it had failed becaUSE 
77Heinz Guderian, Panzer Leader (New York, 1952), pp. 19-21. 
78Hans von Seeckt, Landesverteidigung (Berlin, 1930), p. 37. 
79lli,2., p. 40. 
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the carl3er army had been sacrificed in an attempt for this quick victory and 
the reserves that replaced it were not of sufficient quality to achieve the 
80 
goal. The resultant war of position was not because of poor military leader-
ship but was caused by the influx of such large amounts of ;nen and materials 
that the battlefield became im'l1obilized ..... 1. th a static mass. The employment of 
poorly trained mass arwies inevitably led to a loss of manoueverability and the 
81 
replacement of meaningful strategy with blind attrition. 
Seeckt believed there ,..rere two reasons for the modern development of the 
mass~. The first was the historical growth of nationalism which demanded 
the universal duty of defense qy the entire population. The second reason was 
the modern military concept of total war in which every able-bodied citizen was 
82 expected to serve on the battlefield. It was inevitable then that the mass 
army would be emplqyed. However, it failed to aChieve its purpose of total 
defeat and the war ended because of exhaustion and not from annihilation upon 
83 
which the use of the mass army was based. In the last war, Seeckt found that 
the principle of massiveness had reached a point where it had lost all military 
value. As a result of this he formed the axiom upon which he based his m1lit~ 
thought of the future, "As the mass grew larger, the greater its military and 
84 
spiri tual value declined. II 
80Ibid., p. 41. 
81Ibid., pp. 42-43. 
-
82Ibid., pp. 34-35. 
83Ibid. , p. 35. 
-84l:b1,d., p. 53. 
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Seeckt's military theory was formed from these considerations born of 
Oermany-' s defeat in the war. He framed the major military problems of his tim 
in the irreconcilable terms of quantity and quality and this became his 
principle of action for the formation of the Reichswehr as an army of soldiers 
whose capabilities would overcome larger numbers. 
He saw further that the consequent reduction of quality resulting from th 
mass ar~ is further deteriorated by the intensification of technical develop-
ments in armaments. Total warfare degenerated he felt into a struggle of 
material in which the low value of the individual soldier is indicated by the 
use of new weapons, such as airpower, which demand mass targets. 8S He was 
obviously shocked by the slaughter he had seen on the Eastern Front where the 
86 Russians had valued their weapons more highly than their soldiers. He 
admitted that the mass army which is based on the practicality of short term 
training of vast numbers of men was possible in the nineteenth century with 
its relatively simple weapoIU7, but that technology made such an army 
unthinkable in modern times because of the invention of highly complicated 
87 
and specialized equipment and their rapid replacement. He concluded from 
this that the better the quality or war materials, the greater the quality 
demanded .r the man using them. Large numbers of superficially trained, short 
term conscripts could not take the place of the less numerous career soldiers' 
8S~., p. 36. 
86Ibid., p. 64. 
87 ~., pp. 46-47. 
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professional skill. "In this conflict between quality and quantity we must 
come to the conclusion that improved techniques and complicated weapons 
increase the claims based upon the soldier's value, and not to the false 
88 
conclusion that they can replace his declining worth." 
From this analysis of these and other factors in the defeat of Germany, 
Seeckt drew nine conclusions and stated them in the form of principles which 
could guide the future deve lopment of the Reichswehr. Because they reveal a 
theoretical soundness of his military ability in the light of the events of 
the Second World War, the following is their abbreviated enumeration: 1) when 
a quick victory fails, the resulting long duration brings heavy losses for all 
sidesJ 2) the final outcome results not from military successes but through 
the slow pressure of military, technical, commercial, and political superiorit J 
3) after the first committment of men and materials, there must be a decline 
in their quality and an increase in their number; 4) military operations must 
be handled by a general in the field, but in this he is seriously hindered by 
the large masses of poor quality; 5) in the struggle between man and the 
machine, the machine must always be the victor; 6) modern war has taken on a 
complicated form for which a short period of training no longer suffices; 7) 
the leaders more than the front line soldiers need exhaustive training in 
modern weapons technique; 8) modern war demands a long and intensive knowledge 
of military thought and discipline; 9) it is impossible that a large national 
army be able to maintain over a long period of time the martial spirit which 
88~., p. 48. 
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Seeckt held that future military strategy must be devoted to the attain-
ment of victory by a small, highly-trained force capable of achieving a 
decision before the masses are set in motion. 90 In holding this view, however 
he did not in any way renounce the right of Germany to build a national army 
(Volksheer). The Volksbeer was very necessary as a secondary line of defense 
91 if the regular ar~ should fail in its objective. Although the treaty 
outlawed universal military training, Seeckt insisted that the citizen of a 
state has the moral obligation of patriotism which meant to defend his 
country. Hewever, he cautiously made a distinction between the duty of 
defense (Wehrpflicht) and actual partiCipation in the armed forces 
(Dienstpflicht), pointing out that the latter was only one of the ways of 
92 implementing the former. 
He wrote, "The inner worth of the army has suffered both militarily and 
morally with its enlargement by means of universal conscription. n93 This 
esteem for quality did not mean that he thereby underestimated the role of 
numbers in modern warfare. Germany, he believed, must have a national 
conscript army- (Volksheer) but it would be completely separate from the small 
89Ibid." pp. 64-67. 
90Ibid., p. 69. 
9l~., p. 70. 
92Seeckt" Reicbswehr" p. 38. 
93Seeckt, LandesverteidiSU!ll, p. 44. 
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regular army so as not to impede its high quality.94 Seeckt spoke of the 
Reichswehr as the cadre for the Volksheer and by this he meant that those 
discharged from the professional army would serve as the leaders of the 
national conscripted force. 95 
The role of the Volksheer in a war was seen by Seeckt as protecting the 
nation's territory while the regular army was engaged in the task of defeating 
96 
the aggressor. Besides its military role it also served the state in a 
political way by keeping the entire populace aware of the necessity of perhaps 
being called upon one day to fulfill his patriotic duty to defend his 
country.97 Because their mission is different the Volksheer was not trained 
in the same manner as the regular army, but rather the national purpose of 
98 
patriotism would be stressed. 
As a military man who believed that war was inevitable, Seeckt worked 
against great limitations to ensure Germany's survival in it. Because he 
believed in the bankruptcy of total war, he concentrated his thinking of 
future conflicts in terms of making possible the swift victory by an elite 
force. It is not too diffioult to see in this the line of thinking that 
94Seeckt, Reichswehr, p. 43. 
95~., pp. 28-29 and 45. 
96seeckt, Landesverteidigung, p. 78. 
97~., p. 78. 
98~., p. 81. 
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resulted in the Blitzkrieg. But he did not see that another war of position 
was unlikely because of the mobility that the motor would provide. Nor did 
he realize that the motor would make mass armies mobile on a scale never 
imagined before. But as a military prophet he would score higher than most 
of his contemporaries. He may have underestimated the tank, but not its 
principle. There can be no doubt that Seeckt did his work well and that the 
limitations of the treaty did not achieve their purpose. 
CHAPTER V 
THE mWOLITICAL ARMY 
The international tensions following the Second World War and the rapid 
progress of weapons technology have shown how close the interaction between 
political and militar,r arfairs may become. The question of their proper 
relationship in the formulation of policy is common to every form of govern-
ment and becomes particularly dynamic in times of crisis when the state 
depends for its security upon a military response. An examination of Seeckt's 
political thought must determine what function he claimed for the military in 
the troubled life ot the Weimar Republic. The various aspects ot this 
military-political relationship contained in his published work were the 
position of the army within the state, its relations with the government, the 
parties, and the nation, its part in the determination and execution of state 
policy, and the relative importance of military factors in political 
decisions. Some significant events in his career related to these ideas will 
also be considered. 
Seeckt's conception of the military's role in the state was well defined 
and his various statements in regard to it were consistent with his actions. 
He saw the basic relationship between state and military affairs in terms ot 
the interdependence or the part to the whole. He described the military as 
a state institution, influenced by the state policies, and having direct 
105 
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political functions. l He defined the political functions founded in the 
nature of the armed forces as being first, the executive arm for the defense 
of the Reich from its external and, if necessary, its internal enemies, 
second, the agency which enabled the state to speak from a·position of power 
in its foreign affairs, and third, the model and promoter of national unity, 
order, and discipline. 2 These three :functions, related respectively to the 
Reich, the state, and the nation, have already been considered in general, 
but the precise mission of the military within the state's structure remains 
to be developed. 
There was no doubt in any of Seeckt's writings that he acknowledged the 
army as a dependent of the state and subject to its aims. He agreed with 
Clausewitz that, ItThe army, in accordance with its nature, becomes the first 
servant of the state, of which it is a part. 1t3 No more unequivocal 
expression of the priority of state rather than military aims could be found 
than his assertion, "It cannot be denied that military questions always stand 
in the closest relationship with political policies, which the soldier will 
follow in all planning, in all organizational matters, and also in the 
conduct of war, including its preparation, execution, and conclusion.,,4 
lHans von Seeckt, Moltke, ~ Vorbild (Berlin, 1931), p. 109. 
2Hans von Seeckt, The Future of the German ~mpire, Criticisms and 
Postulates, trans. Oakley WilliamstLondon, 1930 , pp. 13$-137. -
3Hans von Seeckt, Thoughts £f. ! Soldier, trans. Gilbert Waterhouse 
(London, 1930), ,po 78. 
4lIans von Seeckt, Landesverteidigung (Berlin, 1930), p. 17. 
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Seeckt did not believe that the army existed for itself but found its reason 
for being on~ in a political context. 
However, this subserviance of the military to political interests was of 
an unusual kind. To carry out the political goals of the state, the army must 
, 
form a special body within the state. He explained that, "The army has its 
own vital conditions, quite peculiar to itself, and a character distinguishing 
it from all other Stats institutions: th3se traits have to be taken into 
account if the army is not to become a state within the State, but a 
5 
reflection of the State." This exceptional relationship consisted in the 
army's existence as an autonomous organization having the state's complete 
confidence in its ability and loyalty.6 
Seeckt emphasized the ambiguity of such a position when he wrote that, 
"'!'he arIr\Y should become a state within the state, but it should be lIBrged in 
the state through service; in fact, it should itself become the purest image 
ot the state. II7 It is of fundamental importance to understand what he meant 
by this since the words "state within the state" are often quoted in 
connection with his political outlook. 
This remark is not inconsistent with his other statements. As the last 
part ot the sentence indicated, it was intended as a dramatic expression ot 
the type of interdependence which characterized the military as a political 
5Seeckt, Future 2!. Empire, p. 138. 
6~.J p. 139. 
7Seeckt, Thoughts, p. 77. 
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institution. He explained that the army must be separated from the shifting, 
day-to-dq- bickering of party politics in order to remain strong and united to 
serve the interests of the state.8 Freed from such interference to carry on 
its military duties, the ar~ would be able to execute state policy whole-
heartedly and without reservation. In this way the military and its aims 
became identioal with the state. It was in this sense that he concluded this 
seotion by writing, t~e army serves the state and the state alone, for it is 
the state. ,,9 The link that bound the two inseparably together was the 
commonweal whioh they both served. Seeckt never entertained the idea that the 
ar~ was an organization with its own aims separate from those of the state. 
The key to understanding how Seeckt envisioned this as working out in 
practice oan be found in his distinotion between the Reich on the one hand, 
and the state, government, and political parties on the other. He considered 
the state as the political embodiment of the Reich. It was to the Reioh and 
its politioal expression, the state, that the military owed strictest 
allegiance and loyalty. When Seeokt spoke of the army as serving "the state 
and the state alone lt it was in this sense of Reich. The form of state and its 
government were variable factors in the development of the Reich. But as long 
as they represented the Reioh, the military was bound in duty to them. 
The Reiohswehr took an oath to the oonstitution and, although this might 
8~., p. 18-19. 
9Ibid., p. 80. 
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not be an inspiration to duty, Seeckt never questioned its legal force. This 
matter of the oath was important to him because it constituted the legitimacy 
of the political and military hierarchy. Seeckt recalled nostagically how 
simple the question of obedience had been when the soldier took a personal 
oath to the Kaiser and being loyal had meant following imperial orders.10 In 
Seeckt's mind, the Republic could never command such unquestioned submission 
since parliamentary government was factional and divided. Consequently he 
regarded the matter of loyalty to the t'leimar authorities as much more complex 
than to the Kaiser who had been the personal embodiment of the Reich's wide 
variety of interests. Seeckt believed the Republic and its party system did 
away with the identification of the ruler with the Reich in which the officer 
had founded his allegiance. He thought that the state was "too cold" a 
concept for the soldier to serve and that "the constitution, which a 
parliament could change at any moment by a two-thirds majority, was not 
11 
suitable for the foundation of an inner committment." His solution for the 
Reichswehr was that the officer base his loyalty in "the personal, bard-earned 
conception of the duty due to the Fatherland and the voluntary acceptance of 
subordination because of his recognition of this. ,,12 Such was Seeckt' s moral 
solution to the problem of serving the Reich atter 1918 J and this reveals more 
10Seeckt, Moltke, p. 168. 
llHans von Seeckt, E!.! Reichswshr (Leipzig, 1933), p. 67. 
12Ibid• 
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than anything else the estrangement of the Reichswehr from the Republic and 
ita leadership. 
The relation of the military to the state which met the qualification of 
representing the whole nation was clear in Seeckt's mind. Matters of policy 
were determined by the state leader who imposed his decisions upon the 
military. 13 The military on its part had needs and demands which the states-
man must fit into the general framework of the state's policy.14 If, however, 
such demands were rejected for reasons of policy then the military must 
accede, and Seeckt emphasized that directly military matters, such as 
organization, armaments, and training, were not outside the scope of state 
15 policy and could not be limited to purely military decisions. This is a 
clear affirmation that the military was to be subservient to the directing wil 
of the statesman and that political decisions take precedence over military 
considerations • 
However, Seeckt did not believe that this relieved the military commander 
of his own responsibility. In matters of military competency, he must 
champion his own judgments, although the final decision was even here made by 
the political leadership. In such conflicts over judgments of a militarily 
technical nature, resignation rather than insubordination was expected of the 
officer. Seeckt cited the conflict between Bismarck and Moltke over the 
l~ von Seeckt, Gedanken eines Soldaten (Berlin, 1929), p. 56. 
14Ibid., p. 57. 
l'Ibid. 
-
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16 bombardment of Paris as an example of military responsibility. To Seeckt 
there was no question that blind obedience was unworthy of an officer. In 
another connection he wrote, "We hear a lot about leadership and the leader's 
responsibility, just as if the responsibility of the led were thereby wiped 
out. No less sense of responsibility attaches to the obeying than to the 
giving of orders. The fool is without any sense of responsibility; so is the 
slave.,,11 
Seeckt believed that ultimate responsibility for the employment of the 
military rested upon the political leader. "Wars are not made by soldiers, 
but by statesmen • • • and the figures of Cromwell, Frederick the Great> and 
Napoleon, under whom the field army executed the will of the statesman, offer 
18 
no contradiction." But the military leaders must also be aware of the 
reasons and aims for what they are required to do. "It is not enough for the 
field commander to be a good soldier J he must also be at home in the fields 
of domestic and foreign politiCS, for he draws his strength from domestic 
policies, and his victories or defeats are matters which have political 
effects. n19 
His selection of Cromwell and Napoleon show how close he considered the 
association between the political and military spheres and his conviction 
16seeckt, Moltke, p. 131. 
11Seeckt, Future 2!. Empire, p. 26. 
18Seeckt, Landesverteidi~nj, p. 91. 
19Ibid., p. 10. 
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that the "highest and purest type of field connnander is the royal commander." 
This was so, he said, because the king incorporated "the state's ~_a:tson ~'etre 
and was able to coordinate his military and political policies perfectly 
21 
thereby achieving the optimum results. He realized that the end of the 
monarchy meant the severance of this intimate union between the two spheres, 
but he continued to believe that, "The more the political leader unites him-
self with the commander in the field, the nearer will he come to the ideal of 
the royal command.er. 1I22 Seeckt's monarchism was at least partly based on this 
consideration that the effective Power State must have a close military-
political relationship. 
Seeckt's soldier-ruler was neither an amateur general nor an irresponsibl 
visionary. Alexander, he considered the greatest example of a political 
commander whose exploits were "no adventure, but followed an intuitive plan, 
as only genius fashions it.,,23 On the other hand, Napoleon was a creature of 
his period in history, a romantic adventurer for whom one aimless victory 
24 
could only lead to another until ultimate defeat. The reason that Seeckt 
denied Napoleon greatness while granting it to Alexander was that, although 
their work of empire was similar) and though Alexander's general aim was 
20Hans von Seeckt, Antikes Feldherrntum (Berlin) 1929), p. 8. 
21~., pp. 8-9. 
22Ibid., p. 9. 
23ill!!., p. 17. 
24Ibid., p. 33-34. 
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not clear, yet "at no moment in his undertakings do we have the teeling of 
uncertainty, of opportunism. n25 Seeckt's sense of responsibility allowed no 
compassion for the dilettante or the dreamer, and Napoleon was scorned as a 
man who allowed his sense of reality to be corrupted by his phantasies. 26 
He believed that only a genius could combine military and political 
leadership in a single individual and this was the reason most kings delegated 
the actual military power to others more capable than they. In fact, Seeckt 
did not believe that it was entirely desirable to have a genius for a leader 
because lIit is the fate of the great man of action that his work, accomplished 
only through his own efforts, flourishes with him and so also vanishes with 
him. n27 In his biography of Moltke, Seeokt described the ultimate failure ot 
the tollowing examples of genius: Tantalus, Alexander, Frederick II, 
28 Frederick the Great, Napoleon, Goethe, Nietzsche, and Bismarck. His 
position was that as such genius was selt-destructive, unable to be imitated 
because it was exoeptional, "a singular phenomenon which haa had no ancestors 
29 
and can have no followers." He believed that this was for the best because 
geniu8 was amoral, making its own law trom its inner necessity and its good 
was only good for it.3° It was fortunate then that it could not engender 
25~., pp. 17-18. 
26Ibid., p. 33. 
27~., p. 27. 
28Seeckt, Moltke, 13. 
29Ibid., p. 14. 
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successors because the world needed order and tranquility based on mass morals 
(Massenmoral).31 It was better, he concluded, for leaders to have talent 
(~) than genius because talent had a pattern that could develop and 
32 
grow. And he designated the Great General Starf as a good example of talent 
because it successful~ educated the average man and was not ooncerned with 
the genius}3 Seeckt's ideal of military leadership was a talented general 
who worked within the political direction of the state leadership. He had no 
desire to unite the two in a single personality and was certainly aware of the 
future dangers such a development might bring. 
Although Seeckt did not absolutely deny the possibility of direct 
civilian direction of the ~, it was entirely contrary to his concept of the 
correct relationship between the two in which political decisions of policy 
would be carried out by the subordinate military leader as he thought best. 
This independence of action and the special position of the ar~ within the 
state presupposed that the military would have a point of view on policy and 
that it would be allowed to express it by means of its political liaison, the 
Reichswehr Hinistry. He made a clear presentation of what he conceived as 
the role of the army in politics in the following: 
The army is the basis of the state's power and its most mighty weapon. 
It must be prepared for its employment at any moment. This it cannot 
do if its leadership remains without knowledge of the internal 
31lbid., p. 14. 
32Thid• 
-
33Th 
--M., p. 33. 
political situation and without influence on it. It can quite 
suddenly be presented with an insoluable problem. The demand 
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that the army be kept outside of politics is unquestionably 
correct, if by this is understood, that the army, therefore the 
individual soldier, has no influence in administrative measures 
or in any parliamentary matter, as well as being kept aloof from 
party motives. This principle of the unpolitical army should not 
however be so interpreted, that the leadership of the army, there-
fore the Reichswehr Ministry, is kept uninformed of the development 
of state policy. The army desires to exercise its authorized 
influence on policy, for which end it nmst possess knowledge about 
it, in order to form by itself its own opinion. Therefore, it must 
also educate and develop its capacity for the study of policy and 
thereby add a broader perspective to its other tasks.34 
Seeckt's view of the Reichswehr Ministry was that it was a military 
department within the state apparatus whose function was to keep the ar~ 
leadership informed of political policy and in turn to inform the government 
of the military's view of state policy)' In addition to this task, the 
Reichswehr Ministry did part of the work of the Great General Staff such as 
the gathering of foreign military intelligence, higher military education, and 
the stuq, of domestic economic and social conditions.)6 In the three pages 
dealing with the Ministry, Seeckt Showed no recognition of the position of the 
Reichswehr Minister in making military policy or as the civilian head of the 
army. 
The army was a subordinate but special part of the state. Seeckt 
acknowledged in theory the primacy of the political over the military. He als 
stressed the tact that. the &rJIlY' needed to be commanded by military men in 
J4seeckt, !.t!tichswehr, p. 79. 
35Ibid. 
-
36 8 ~., pp. 77-7 • 
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order to be the effective executive arm of the state. He nowhere explicitly 
developed the manner in which the Reich President replaoed the Kaiser as 
Supreme War IDrd. But from what he wrote concerning military direotion by 
politioal leaders, he was not anxious to have a civilian head of government 
involved in military operations.31 He believed that the practical relationshi 
between the state and military leaders was one of olose oooperation in working 
38 
together for a oommon goal. In his book on Moltke, Seeckt showed how much 
39 
cooperation had worked in the case of Bismarok and his ohief of staff. 
Seeoktts main point was that Bismarok's sucoess was possible only 
through the planning of Maltke. This was true, he said, because all military 
planning must be based on political considerations and take into aooount the 
situation and aims of the state.40 In the case of Bismarck, it was Moltke who 
provided the neoessary information of what was possible for Prussia militarily 
41 
and henoe, politically. Because of Moltke's understanding of the political 
implioations of his military strategy he allowed Bismarck the opportunity to 
change his decisions in regard to policy aims. Seeckt wrote of this that, 
"Bismarok, with his will of genius, followed the deadly, steel-hard energy of 
31 64 Seeokt, Gedanken, p. • 
38~., p. 63. 
39Saeckt , Maltke, pp. 110-144. 
40Ibid., p. 111. 
41Ibid., p. 123. 
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Moltke to victory." Seeckt saw in this cooperation "the greatest example 
of how the military commander committed to the state's aims must add to the 
directing will of the statesman, so that both uphold the same energy of 
action. tt43 He concluded his study of their relationship by pointing out two 
principles: first, the military must keep the statesman informed about 
military considerations that have a bearing on state policy, and second, 
although the statesman decided policy, the military must be free to decide on 
question of strategy. 44 The second point reaffirms Seeckt I s be lief that the 
army must be commanded by the military. 
If Seeckt's understanding of the government's control of the army was 
rather tenuous, his attitude towards the political parties and the military 
was directly to the point. He believed that the army would compromise its 
very nature and organization if it we~e to have political committments other 
than to the Reich. For that reason soldiers were not to be affiliated with 
any political association nor did they have the right to vote~5 In the matter 
of the various parties, the military had no preferenoe, but they could not 
accept in their ranks those who came from parties which exhibited "an anti-
state sentiment.,,46 It was in this sense of isolation from party politics, 
that Seeckt conoeived of the army as being completely unpolitical. 
42~., p. llB. 
43~., p. 120. 
44Ibid., pp. 141-142. 
-
45Seeckt , Reichswehr, p. 9B. 
46Ibid. 
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From these theoretical considerations of Seecktfs thought it is now 
possible to examine the motivation behind some of his actions. The first of 
these was his refusal to approve the government decision to use force to 
crush the Kapp Putsch of March 13, 1920. At the meeting called by Noske, the 
Reichswehr Minister, only Reinhardt .. the Chief of the Army Command, backed the 
government position. Seeckt, speaking for the other officers present .. 
opposed the use of the Reichswehr against the various military units that had 
declared for the insurgents, remarking that, "Soldiers do not fire upon 
soldiers .tt47 Learning that the generals disapproved the use of force against 
the rebels, the government left Berlin to the Kappists who found the civil 
service and the officers of the Army Command unwilling to cooperate with them. 
The solidarity of the general strike brought about the end of the Putseh in 
four days. 
In the whole affair Seeckt was motivated by his theoretical consideration 
of the necessity of maintaining the German army as strong and undivided. The 
use of the Reichswehr to fire on their fellow soldiers, mostly Freikorps 
units being mustered out of the Provisional Reichswehr would have had 
disuteroul effects on later. discipline. There Were also two practical 
factors in his decision. One was his uncertainty of the discipline of the 
troops during a period of unsure legality in which comm.ands of the rebel 
military authorities might appear to have legitimacy. Seeckt assessed the 
situation correctly because many officers became utter~ confused about whose 
47Friedrich von Rabenau. Seeckt. ~ seinem Leben 1918-1936 (Leipzig, 
1940), p. 221. 
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orders to follow, some switching sides several times. 48 The second factor was 
that Seeckt could not be sure whether the loyal troops, in the midst of their 
reorganization into the new units of the R.eichswehr, were a match for the 
compact and proved Freikorps which made up the bulk of the Kappist forces. 49 
Such were the reasons for Seeckt's opposition to Noske's plan of military 
resistance. His actions after this decision do not indicate a~ disloyalty 
to Ebert's legitimate government nor anything but disapproval of the rebels. 
His view of the means to quell the Putsch did not coincide with that of his 
superior, Noske, and hence, after ordering his subordinates not to follow the 
commands of the Kappists, he formally resigned. 50 He then offered his 
service and influence to Ebert's representative in Berlin who, after the 
collapse of the ~tsch, chose him to take charge of the confused military 
situation as acting chief of the Army Command.'l 
Seeckt had remained loyal to hi8 constitutional oath and he was 
convinced that the military leaders who backed the Putsch were guilty of 
treason. But his decision was primarily dictated by considerations of 
military unity and, even if the chances of defeating the Kappists had been 
much better, it is doubtful whether he would have been for military inter-
vention which would have affected the future army adversely. Ch-anted the 
48Harold J. Gordon, Jr., The Reichswehr and the German Re~blic 1919-
1926 (Princeton, New Jersey, l~), pp. tjO-lli'O: - -
49Rabenau, Seeckt, p. 2.34. 
50a0rdon, Reichswehr, p. 118. 
51Ibid., p. 125. 
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unsettled conditions of the embryo Reichswehr and the necessity of fashioning 
an unified organization out of a badly demoralized group of fighting men, it 
is difficult to imagine another alternative other than avoiding fratricidal 
warfare. 
Such considerations of unity are not limited to one military system, but 
are a part ot military thought. During the troubles that preceded Charles de 
Gaulle's assumption of power, part of the military became discontented with 
the authorities of the Fourth Republic. When the army in Algeria involved 
itself in a revolution against the Paris government, General Ely, although 
personally opposed to the motives and actions of the rebels, "resigned as 
Chief of Staft rather than issue an order calling upon units in France to 
oppose their brothers soldiers from Algeria. ,,52 In the case of the Reichswehr 
there was even more reason for such a course of action since the solidarity 
ot the young army was just being tormed in its transition from the newly 
prohibited Provisional Reichswshr. 
Seeckt's ideas on the separation ot the military from party politics was 
shown at the time ot his first proclamation to the Otticer Corps in which he 
drew the lessons ot the Kapp Putsch. He reminded them that "the soldier 
stands true to his constitutional duty" and treasonable activities" on the 
part ot the military stemmed trom political shortsightedness" which would only 
5.3 lead to politicians intertering in army aftairs. The burden ot the address 
52!!!! Magazine (February 2.3, 1958). 
53Edgar von Schr.lidt-Pauli, General v. Seeckt: Lebensbild eines 
deutschen Soldaten (Berlin, 19.37), pp. 90-97. 
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was that the new Reichswehr was on trial and must give no justification for 
54 
such intervention. The tone of his remarks would seem to indicate that 
Seeckt had a real fear that this might happen. 
The case of the 1923 Munich Putsch was entirely different from that of 
Kapp. First of all, it was bound up with Bavarian separatism whose aim was 
to destroy the unity of the Reich, something Seeckt had always opposed. 
Secondly, he was certain as to the loyalty of a tightly unified army_ Lastly, 
there was involved the question of internal army discipline in General von 
1&ssow1s direct refusal of an order. For all these reasons, Seeckt from the 
beginning of the trouble in Bavaria determined upon a policy of immediate use 
of force and, in fact, was over-ruled by the government, an ironic reversal 
of their previous roles.55 
"The Reichswehr stands behind me" was a remark Seeckt made in answer to 
Ebert's question of the army's political loyalty. This statement has been 
often quoted as an indication of Seeckt 1 s political power. Seeckt in 1936 
gave the following explanation to a fellow officer: 
" ••• Ebert knew ot the attempts of Rightist circles to make the 
Reichswehr their party army, while he was being pressed by his 
people to influence it in favor of the Social Democrats. He 
asked me how I stood on this question. I sharply rejected both 
influences, whereupon he asked me, excitedly: Behind whom then 
did the Reichswehr really stand? My answer was: 'The Reichswehr 
stands behind me.' "56 
54Ibid. 
5500r don, ~iChswehr, p. 239. 
56Ibid., pp. 278-279 quoted from the .. Seeckt Papers, Stuck 278. 
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The implication of the statement is clearly one of military discipline over 
party politics within the army. It does not contradict any of his many state-
ments as to the military's duty of obedience to the state nor does it change 
the limitations he put on the autonomy of the military or its role in 
influencing policy. 
There is also the question of Seeckt's own political ambitions while on 
active duty. On November 2, 1923, after tmlch urging by his associates, he 
came to the conclusion that the only way to save the Reich from perpetual 
disunity was for him to become Chancellor, dictator" or member of a 
directory.57 The following day he called on Ebert and then returned to tell 
his friends that the time was not ripe for him to take power "or ganically .1158 
After this he often considered the idea of running as an independent for 
President but he was realistic enough to know that he had no mass a.ppeal.59 
In 1924 he decided to seek the Presidential nomination of the conservative 
parties at the end of Ebert's term of office, but the premature death of the 
60 President ended all of his plans of becoming head of state. These thoughts 
seem to have been prompted by his belief that he alone was the man who could 
save Germany from continual crisis. He was motivated by good intentions, as 
57Rabenau, Seeckt, pp. 363-365. 
58~., p. 364. 
59Ibid., p. 386. 
60Ibid., pp. 413-414. 
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his visit to Ebert demonstrated, but he violated his own regulations concern-
ing political activities by members of the army. It does not appear that he 
pursued his quest for political power too seriously and a remark made about 
him at the time was that he was one of the many military leaders who "having 
61 
at last reached the Rubicon, simply sit down on its banks and fish." 
Seeckt's attitude to Hitler's National Socialist Party is not entirely 
clear. His biography, published during the war, naturally contained no anti-
Hitler material. However, while one illustration pictured the two smiling 
happily at an army review, it oould not have been an accident that another 
showed Seeckt and General werner von Fritsch wbo was disgraced by Rimmler in 
1938. Seeckt's first meeting with Himmler was March 12, 1923 wben Ritler 
promised that the SA (Sturmabteilun,> would never figbt the Reicbswerb.62 
Rabenau gave a tactual presentation of tbe Munich Putsch emphasizing Kabr' s 
role. Seeckt had a meeting with Hitler in 1931 in which he agreed about his 
goals but not about tbe means ot obtaining them .. 63 In 1932 he advised his 
sister to vote tor Hitler rather than Hindenburg.64 other than that there is 
no direct evidence of his relations with Hitler. From April 1933 to 1935 he 
was outside Germany and Rabenau presents none ot the ideas he must have had 
about certain ot Hitler's activities. This silence in his biography makes 
242. 
61Ernst von Salomon, The Answers ot Ernst von Salomon (London 1954), p. 
62Rabenau, Seeckt, p. 347. 
6)~., p. 660. 
64Ibid., p. 665. 
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obvious his criticism, the only kind possible in a dictatorship. 
Many of Hitler's aims may have been identical with Seeckt's objectives: 
a unified nation in a centralized Reich, the substitution of a national party 
for parliamentary government, the abrogation of the peace treaty, the 
creation of a power:t'ul national arnw, the resumption of a philosophy of force 
in a Power State. And yet Hitler, as a leader, represented much that Seeckt 
time and again in his writings condemned: opportunist, dilettante, politician 
dreamer, scoundrel. Seeckt must have been shaken, for instance, by the Purge 
of 1934, in which some of the leading figures who had taken a part in crushing 
Hitler's Putsch in 1923, were assassinated out of revenge. Even though the 
Purge ostensibly represented the end of the SA as a military organization, 
its lack of discipline and clear illegality must have been abhorent to a man 
such as Seeckt. It is surprising that German officers did not earlier than 
1944 follow his distinction between party, state, and Reich, although there 
was the example of General Indwig Beck's resignation in 1938 as Chief of 
Starf. Perhaps the best indication of Seeckt's thought as it applied to 
National Socialism is the fact that General Rabenau, his devoted pupil, took 
part in the Officers' Plot of July 20, 1944 against Hitler and was executed 
for it.65 
It would be an oversimplification to label Seeckt's political thought as 
militaristic. What seems to be its point of divergence from other military 
65Gerhard Ritter, The German Resistance: Carl Goerdeler's Stru,~le 
Against Tyranny, trans. R. T. CWl( (New York l~, pp. 92-93and 2 • 
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systems was his insistence upon the special separateness of the ar~ from 
other political agencies of the state. It would appear that this was 
dictated by his fear that the Reichswehr would be fragmented by the divisive-
ness which he considered the congenital disease of parliamentary politics. 
He was determined that military personnel would have nothing to do with the 
struggle of the various politioal parties and political neutrality became a 
policy of isolation from the struggles of the young Republio. The individual 
offioer became a politioal specialist insensitive to the domestic political 
difficulties of the republican government. Such was the result of Seecktts 
attempt to make the ar~ a vital part of the Reich without active participatio 
in its problems. There may have been other, less dangerous alternatives for 
the creation of a strong defense force under the treaty restrictions. But 
Seeckt's political thought impelled him to take the course he did. Hans 
Guderian, one of the men who was trained in the Reichswehr, gave a final 
judgment on the outcome of Seeckt's political thought. 
His struggle to keep the ar~ free from the influence of party 
politics was undoubtedly correct from his point of view, it had, 
however, in the long run an unfortunate result in that the Officer 
Corps in general, and the future General Staff Corps offioers in 
particular, were in consequence largely uneducated in matters of 
internal and external politics. That was the principle weakness 
of his system.66 
6~ans Guderian, Panzer Leader, trans. Constantine Fitzgibbon (New York, 
1952), p. 457. 
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